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CLOSING INTERNATIONAL LOOPHOLES:  
CHANGING THE CORPORATE TAX BASE TO 
EFFECTIVELY COMBAT TAX AVOIDANCE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
NoTax is a publicly traded technology corporation that deals 
primarily with internet-based services and products.  NoTax is 
headquartered in California, incorporated in Delaware, and does the 
majority of its business within the United States.  In 2010, NoTax 
reported three hundred and fifty million dollars in worldwide revenue 
to its shareholders and reported a net income of one hundred million 
dollars to the IRS.  NoTax paid the standard 35% federal tax rate, or 
thirty-five million dollars, to the IRS.  Subsequently, NoTax’s president 
and board of directors decided to hire a group of tax consultants and 
attorneys to see if there was a way to reduce their corporate tax.  In 2011, 
NoTax reported approximately the same level of revenue and business 
to its shareholders but reported a much lower net income and only paid 
around two million dollars to the IRS.  NoTax did not physically move 
its headquarters, change its products, or cut any employees.  How was it 
able to cut its corporate taxes by nearly thirty-three million dollars?  
NoTax employed a complex scheme of tax planning strategies to 
manipulate its financial records, take advantage of international tax 
loopholes, and avoid paying U.S. taxes.  Even more remarkable, NoTax 
was able to do this primarily with paper transactions that are completely 
legal.1 
Many U.S. corporations have started using similar tax avoidance 
strategies to reduce their corporate tax.2  These strategies have become a 
problem in the last few decades because of the globalization of the world 
economy, improvements in technology, and increased tax competition.3  
                                                 
1 NoTax is a fictional company.  The author of this Note created this hypothetical to 
explain the concept of international tax avoidance. 
2 “Tax avoidance” refers to the legal strategies corporations employ to get around 
paying taxes, as opposed to “tax evasion,” which refers to the avoidance of tax obligations 
through illegal means.  See JANE G. GRAVELLE, MAJOR TAX ISSUES IN THE 111TH CONGRESS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 13 (May 6, 2009), http://royce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 
major_tax_issues_in_the_111th_congress.pdf (explaining the major differences between tax 
evasion and tax avoidance techniques); see also Michelle Hirsch, Tax Havens:  Offshore 
Operations Cost U.S. Billions, FISCAL TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_ 
files/071708PSIReport.pd (noting that eighty-three out of the largest one hundred publicly 
traded U.S. companies have subsidiaries in countries with lower corporate tax rates than 
the United States). 
3 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575–76 (2000) (discussing the increased mobility of 
capital from technology advances, which has led to international tax competition because 
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Most of these methods involve setting up a shell corporation—a 
corporation with no operations or assets—as a subsidiary in a lower tax 
jurisdiction and then manipulating the parent corporation’s financial 
records to show that the income was earned by the shell subsidiary 
outside of the United States.4  What these corporations are doing is 
technically legal, but only because of the difficulty of applying U.S. tax 
law to other sovereign countries.5  There have been many attempts to try 
to fix this current tax avoidance problem while keeping the same tax 
base, but these have all proved to be ineffective, which is evident from 
the alarming number of corporations that are employing tax avoidance 
schemes.6  Tax avoidance strategies are causing the United States to lose 
                                                                                                             
companies can easily shift capital to low-tax jurisdictions).  Tax competition in this context 
refers to countries lowering their tax rates to make it more desirable for corporations to do 
business in their country.  Id.  See also Jason Bordoff & Jason Furman, General Essay, 
Progressive Tax Reform in the Era of Globalization:  Building Consensus for More Broadly Shared 
Prosperity, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 328 (2008) (explaining that tax reform might be 
necessary with recent changes in the economy); Timothy V. Addison, Shooting Blanks:  The 
War on Tax Havens, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703, 711 (2009) (discussing several 
reasons for why tax havens exist); Diane Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy?:  
International Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
649, 702 (2010) (explaining why some countries lower their tax rates). 
4 See Press Release, The White House, Executive Office of the President, Leveling the 
Playing Field:  Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs 
Overseas, May 4, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
LEVELING-THE-PLAYING-FIELD-CURBING-TAX-HAVENS-AND-REMOVING-TAX-
INCENTIVES-FOR-SHIFTING-JOBS-OVERSEAS/ [hereinafter Press Release] (providing 
examples of several problems that exist under current U.S. law and describing proposals to 
fix each problem). 
5 See Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy:  Emerging to 
an Allocation Phase, 28 VA. TAX REV. 165, 166 (2008) (noting how the corporate structure has 
changed because of changes in the global economy); Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the 
Sovereignty Debate?:  International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 156–57 
(2008) (explaining the link between sovereignty and international tax laws).  Countries are 
not able to enforce their tax laws in other sovereign states because those sovereign states 
represent the supreme source of the law on internal matters, such as corporate taxation.  Id. 
at 160.  See also David R. Tillinghast, Issues of International Tax Enforcement, in THE CRISIS IN 
TAX ADMINISTRATION 38, 38–42 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (discussing a 
number of challenges facing the IRS in enforcing U.S. tax laws in foreign jurisdictions, as 
well as the complexity of the Tax Code and the difficulty in obtaining financial 
information).  See generally Nancy Birdsall, Asymmetric Globalization:  Global Markets Require 
Good Global Politics, (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 12, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106282 (explaining how the global 
economy has made it more difficult to enforce tax laws). 
6 See Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”:  The Cost Sharing Regulations and the 
Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 642–44 (2007) 
(explaining the Arm’s Length Standard as one attempt to prevent corporate tax avoidance 
through the use of subsidiaries); see also Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax 
Shelters in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 588–92 (2010) (describing the judiciary’s 
development of different common law doctrines to combat tax avoidance, such as 
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billions of annual tax dollars that could be used to pay off the current 
budget deficit.7  Allowing corporations to escape paying U.S. taxes when 
they actively derive benefits from the U.S. market is unacceptable.8  The 
attempts and proposals to fix this problem through legislation have 
focused on creating laws to force corporations to stop manipulating their 
net income; however, the more effective method to combat this issue 
might be changing the tax base altogether.9  This Note proposes that the 
United States needs to change the current tax base so that corporations 
no longer have the incentive to manipulate their financial information.10 
First, Part II of this Note briefly provides a historical context of the 
U.S. corporate tax, presenting relevant background information, theories 
for and against taxation, and popular techniques used by corporations to 
avoid tax.11  Next, Part III offers an analysis of the current tax base and 
                                                                                                             
“substance over form,” “step-transaction,” “business purpose,” and “economic 
substance”); Abrahm W. Smith, Tax Dodgers Beware:  New Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Legislation, 84 FLA. B.J., July–Aug. 2010, at 52–53 (explaining legislative attempts by the 
Obama Administration to correct the tax avoidance problem); Anthony D. Todero, Note, 
The Stop Haven Abuse Act:  A Unilateral Solution to a Multilateral Problem, 19 MINN. J. INTL. L. 
241, 258–60 (2010) (examining the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (STHAA), which was another 
attempt to prevent corporations from establishing tax havens). 
7 See Frederick J. Tansill, Asset Protection Trusts (APTS):  Non-Tax Issues, ST012 A.L.I.-
A.B.A., in INT’L TRUST & EST. PLAN. 293, 309 (2011) (noting how President Obama’s 
administration had clear plans to crack down on tax avoidance to pay for the U.S. deficit); 
see also Lilian V. Faulhaber, Sovereignty, Integration and Tax Avoidance in the European Union:  
Striking the Proper Balance, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, 179 (2010) (explaining that tax 
avoidance is a problem, not only in the United States, but also in the European Union); 
Hirsch, supra note 2 (explaining that U.S. multinational corporations are collectively 
avoiding anywhere between $10 billion and $60 billion a year in taxes by shifting their 
earnings on paper to overseas subsidiaries); Anup Shah, Tax Havens; Undermining 
Democracy, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.globalissues.org/article/54/tax-havens-
undermining-democracy (last updated July 12, 2009) (explaining some effects that tax 
havens are having on the U.S. economy). 
8 See infra Part II (discussing the benefits theory of taxation).  The U.S. companies that 
are using these tax avoidance strategies are taking advantage of the benefits that the U.S. 
market provides.  Id.  See also Jennifer Barton, Comment, Running from the United States 
Treasury:  The Need to Reform the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 43 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 1041, 1051 (2010) (noting the need for reform in the corporate tax structure because of 
tax avoidance issues). 
9 See I.R.C. § 11 (2006) (containing the current tax base for corporations—net income); 
Rachelle Y. Holmes, Deconstructing the Rules of Corporate Tax, 25 AKRON TAX J. 1, 2 (2010) 
(noting that most proposed solutions to the tax problem are structural, including statutory 
changes to stop companies from using loopholes); see also infra Part IV (proposing a change 
in the tax base, thus altering the way that companies are taxed altogether, rather than 
adding new laws to the already complicated Tax Code). 
10 See infra Part IV (explaining how changing the tax base to corporate revenue will 
decrease the incentive to shift income abroad and avoid paying U.S. taxes). 
11 See infra Part II (providing relevant background information on U.S. corporate 
taxation, as well as describing popular tax avoidance methods and previous legislation). 
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its weaknesses.12  Further, Part III illustrates the potential effects of 
failing to change the tax base in the near future.13  Finally, Part IV 
proposes a change of the tax base that will take away corporations’ 
incentives to manipulate their financial records and that will fairly tax 
corporations based on the benefits they derive from the U.S. market, 
which will lead to a much more efficient and profitable U.S. economy.14 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Despite recent legislative changes aimed at stopping U.S. corporate 
tax avoidance and President Obama’s full commitment to reforming the 
corporate tax system, many corporations continue to use aggressive tax 
planning to circumvent much of their corporate tax obligations.15  There 
is difficulty in making effective legislative changes, because there are 
many problems with the U.S. corporate tax base—or general pool of 
wealth to which tax liability is imposed.16  Currently, the U.S. corporate 
tax base consists of net income, which is calculated by taking revenues 
and adjusting for (subtracting) expenses, interest, depreciation, taxes, 
and amortization.  Corporations are presently able to manipulate their 
                                                 
12 See infra Part III (analyzing why the current tax base has led to corporate tax 
avoidance). 
13 See infra Part III (presenting the possible effects on the U.S. economy of continuing to 
allow corporations to legally avoid paying taxes). 
14 See infra Part IV (proposing a change to the current tax base that will eliminate the 
corporate incentive to transfer income abroad in order to avoid paying U.S. taxes); see also 
The World’s Largest Economies, ECONOMYWATCH.COM (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.economywatch.com/economies-in-top/ (noting the profitability of top 
economies in the world). 
15 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 2 n.3 (explaining some recent prevalent recommendations 
for changing the U.S. tax system); Kaye, supra note 6, at 594 (explaining the emergence of 
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which enacted new penalties, strengthened 
disclosure requirements, and changed substantive law against tax shelters); David J. Lynch, 
Does Tax Code Send U.S. Jobs Offshore?, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2008-03-20-corporate-tax-
offshoring_N.htm (“‘Big businesses will always look for ways to skirt the tax code.  An 
Obama administration will close loopholes and will tighten (IRS) enforcement so 
companies cannot go around tax regulations,’ says Bill Burton, a spokesman for the Obama 
campaign.”). 
16 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the tax base as the “total 
property, income, or wealth subject to taxation in a given jurisdiction; the aggregate value 
of the property being taxed by a particular tax”); Melissa J. Morrow, Comment, Twenty-Five 
Years of Debate:  Is Acquisition-Value Property Taxation Constitutional?  Is It Fair?  Is It Good 
Policy?, 53 EMORY L.J. 587, 591 (2004) (“The tax base is the ‘assessed value’ of the taxable 
property.”). 
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net income, because it is separately reported to the IRS, and there is no 
incentive for them to keep this figure high.17 
Before analyzing the benefits associated with changing the corporate 
tax base, Part II.A of this Note provides the key history of the corporate 
tax, highlighting the major theories supporting why corporations should 
be taxed.18  Next, Part II.B lays out the basic framework of how 
corporations are taxed in the United States.19  Part II.C then examines the 
major tax avoidance techniques that corporations use, providing a more 
in-depth context of these techniques by looking at what Google does to 
reduce its taxes.20  Then, Part II.D briefly mentions four of the most 
popular proposals to fix tax avoidance in the United States.21 
A. The History of the Corporate Tax 
The corporate tax was first enacted in 1909 on corporate income to 
provide support for a general individual income tax on citizens.22  The 
goals of this tax were:  (1) to provide the government with knowledge 
about profits in order to prevent the abuse of power; (2) to raise 
additional revenue; (3) to supervise corporations; and (4) to discourage 
excessive borrowing.23  Many corporations challenged the tax in court, 
                                                 
17 See infra Part III (analyzing the problems with the current tax base); see also MICHAEL 
MAZEROV, STATE CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS AND THE NEED FOR “COMBINED REPORTING” 1 
(CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-26-
07sfp.pdf (advocating for combined reporting); Michael J. McIntyre, Paull Mines & Richard 
D. Pomp, Designing a Combined Reporting Regime for a State Corporate Income Tax:  A Case 
Study of Louisiana, 61 LA. L. REV. 699, 702–05 (2001) (examining the benefits of a combined 
reporting regime for corporations at the state level). 
18 See infra Part II.A (providing the key history of the corporate tax and highlighting the 
major theories supporting why corporations should be taxed). 
19 See infra Part II.B (laying out the basic framework of how corporations are taxed in the 
United States). 
20 See infra Part II.C (providing a more in-depth context of the major tax avoidance 
techniques by specifically looking at what Google does to reduce its taxes). 
21 See infra Part II.D (defining four of the most popular proposals to fix the U.S. tax 
avoidance problem). 
22 See Corporate Tax Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-4, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (establishing the 
corporate tax by creating an excise tax for corporations measured by corporate income); see 
also Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 447, 464 (2001) (noting that there were several motivations for the first 
corporate income tax); Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Income Tax:  A Persistent Policy 
Challenge, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 75, 78 (2011) (explaining that there was support for the income 
tax because it taxed the wealthy, reduced the concentration of power, and provided for a 
flexible revenue source). 
23 See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA:  A SHORT HISTORY 50–52 
(1996) (highlighting how corporations originally fit into the U.S. tax policy); SIDNEY 
RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280–83 (1980) (providing a detailed 
account of the congressional deliberations that lead up to the Corporate Tax Act of 1909). 
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because they thought the government was overstepping its boundaries, 
discouraging the corporate form, and killing the profit motive.24  The 
Supreme Court upheld the tax, reasoning that it was an appropriate tax 
on the privilege of doing business in the corporate capacity.25 
Then, in 1918, the taxation of international income began with the 
Revenue Act of 1918, which allowed a credit against U.S. income for 
taxes paid by a U.S. corporation to any foreign government on income 
earned outside the United States.26  In 1928, the League of Nations 
created the first model bilateral treaty agreement, giving a corporation 
relief from being taxed twice on income earned abroad.27  Subsequently, 
in 1934, the Supreme Court decided, in Helvering v. Gregory, that a 
corporation could not simply “reorganize” for tax purposes and that 
                                                 
24 See Gravelle, supra note 22, at 78–79 (noting some general reasons why many people 
opposed the 1909 corporate income tax); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and 
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 125 (1990) (illustrating some of the 
objections to the corporate income tax in 1909). 
25 See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 176 (1911) (upholding the corporate excise 
tax in its entirety); see also Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 118 (explaining that the Corporate 
Tax Act of 1909 was challenged immediately after it was enacted, but a decision by the 
Supreme Court was not rendered until 1911). 
26 See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18 §§ 222(a)(1), 238(a), 240(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080–82 
(1919) (providing a foreign tax credit for individuals and a similar credit for domestic 
corporations and describing creditable taxes).  The Revenue Act of 1921 limited this foreign 
tax credit so that it could not exceed the amount of the U.S. tax liability on the taxpayer’s 
foreign source income.  Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136 §§ 222(a)(5), 238(a), 42 Stat. 227, 249, 
258 (1923).  This limitation was intended to ensure that U.S. companies and individuals 
could not use foreign taxes to reduce or eliminate U.S. taxes on U.S. source income.  Id. 
27 See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International 
Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1023 (1997) (explaining the importance of the League of 
Nations’ 1928 model bilateral income tax treaties); C. John Taylor, Twilight of the 
Neanderthals, or Are Bilateral Double Taxation Treaty Networks Sustainable?, 34 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 268, 270–71 (2010) (providing a brief history of bilateral tax treaties as a model to 
relieve corporations from double taxation).  Double taxation refers to instances where 
income is taxed by one jurisdiction and then taxed again by another jurisdiction.  Id.  For 
example, if country A taxes a corporation at a rate of 35% on income because the income 
was earned in its county, and then country B taxes the same income by that corporation at a 
rate of 30% because that corporation is a resident of country B, then the corporation is 
forced to pay an astronomically high total effective tax rate of 65% on that net income.  See 
infra part II.B (explaining in more depth source income and residence income).  One way 
that countries eliminate double taxation is by cooperating with each other through bi-
lateral tax treaties.  See also Sunita Jogarajan, Prelude to the International Tax Treaty Network:  
1815–1914 Early Tax Treaties and the Conditions for Action, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 679, 680 
(2011) (noting that there are over three thousand bilateral tax treaties in the world 
currently).  The common bilateral tax treaties account for double taxation by making it so 
that one country agrees unilaterally not to impose tax on income earned in another 
country, reducing the amount of tax payable in their country for any tax paid in another 
country on the same income, or by allocating taxation rights from different types of 
incomes between the different countries.  Id. at 683. 
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there must be a business purpose for the corporate reorganization 
outside of saving on corporate taxes.28  This decision was particularly 
important because it was the first decision addressing corporate 
techniques to avoid paying taxes.29  The international income tax regime 
has remained reasonably intact, despite the growth of the economy, 
increases in technology, and the globalization of business.30 
Throughout history, the U.S corporate income tax has been based on 
the benefit theory of taxation, which indicates that corporations should 
be taxed because they take advantage of the benefits that the state 
provides.31  The United States taxes corporations under this theory in 
                                                 
28 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (holding that the transfer of the original 
corporation’s assets to the shareholder did not qualify as reorganization because it was a 
“mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for 
concealing its real character”).  The Court further held that there had to be a business 
purpose for the reorganization and not just the benefit of saving on taxes.  Id. 
29 Id.  Though it was not a decision regarding corporations using international law to 
avoid taxes, the decision represented the Court’s stance that business decisions should not 
be made for the sole reason of avoiding taxes.  Id.  These types of decisions affect the 
business market and make it less efficient.  See Donald C. Lubick, Remarks to the Tax 
Executives Institute, reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 19–21 
(Michael J. Graetz ed., 2003) (explaining different policy goals in the area of international 
taxation).  The goals of having an efficient market, market neutrality, and a competitive 
market sometimes conflict, and the goal is to find to what extent taxation can be reduced to 
stay competitive internationally while not distorting business decisions based on this 
reduced taxation.  Id.  The author then explains the two major types of efficiency norms 
that exist in the market:  (1) capital import neutrality (CIN) and (2) capital export neutrality 
(CEN).  Id. at 21.  See also William B. Barker, International Tax Reform Should Begin at Home:  
Replace the Corporate Income Tax with a Territorial Expenditure Tax, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
647, 654 (2010) (explaining that an efficient tax is a neutral tax, which does not change the 
relative price of goods or services). 
30 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 3, at 1575–76 (explaining how technological advances have 
led to a much more global economy); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 4 (2003) (noting that the basic framework of the 
international structure remains the same as it did in the early 1920s).  The author explains 
that the basic international tax structure has not changed, because it has never proved to be 
a barrier to the international flow of goods, services, or capital.  Id.  See generally Holmes, 
supra note 9, at 3 (noting that the only two major changes in international tax law came in 
the form of the Revenue Act of 1962 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986). 
31 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52. TAX L. REV. 
507, 521 (1997) (explaining the Benefits Principle, which gives the right to tax active 
business income primarily to the source jurisdiction, while the right to tax passive 
investment income is assigned primarily to the residence jurisdiction); Jeffrey M. Colón, 
Changing U.S. Tax Jurisdiction:  Expatriates, Immigrants, and the Need for a Coherent Tax Policy, 
34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 11 (1997) (“The theoretical basis for source and trade or business 
taxation is that the United States has provided the benefits that generated the income.”); 
Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity:  Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the 
International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 144 n.79 (2009) (explaining that source income, 
or income earned in one country, is based on the notion that the government has the right 
to collect tax revenues by providing the services that make the creation of that underlying 
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two different ways:  (1) on the benefits resulting from being incorporated 
in the United States, or residence based tax; and (2) on the benefits that 
corporations receive from using the U.S. market to derive their income, 
or source based tax.32  Examples of some of the benefits that U.S. 
corporations receive include the:  transportation facilities, infrastructure, 
education system, labor force, financial institutions, customer base, and 
stock markets.33  The basic framework of the U.S. tax system follows this 
theory and taxes corporations based on their residence and whether their 
income is derived within the United States.34 
                                                                                                             
income possible); Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation:  Citizenship as an 
Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1293–94 (2011) (maintaining that 
source based taxation reflects the notion that a certain tax jurisdiction provides benefits that 
protect income and assets maintained in that jurisdiction); see also Peggy B. Musgrave, 
Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation:  Principles and Applications to the European 
Union (2000), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 6 (Michael J. 
Graetz ed., 2003) (explaining that a jurisdiction should be able to charge a tax to pay for the 
services that it renders). 
32 See Deborah A. Geier, Letter to the Editor, Time to Bring Back the “Benefit” Norm?, 102 
TAX NOTES 1155, 1157 (2004) (advocating the benefits theory of taxation because of the 
exploitation of the U.S. economic system); Majorie E. Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax Rate 
Structure in the Face of Disagreement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1708 (2005) (“[B]enefit taxation 
underlies international tax principles that allow both the country of residence and the 
source country to tax income.”); Herwig J. Schlunk, Double Taxation:  The Unappreciated 
Ideal, 102 TAX NOTES 893, 895 (2004) (explaining the two types of taxation and analyzing 
them under the benefits theory); see also infra Part II.B (explaining the framework of U.S. tax 
policy, specifically residence and source based taxation). 
33 See Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540, 
1553–54 (2009) (explaining some of the benefits conferred on corporations associated with 
source based taxation, including human resources, natural resources, infrastructure, and 
markets); see also Musgrave, supra note 31, at 6 (explaining the more complicated benefits 
that come from source and residence based income).  A company may also benefit by 
having a lower intermediate goods cost, which in turn lowers the total cost of production.  
Id.  Benefits also arise when the government contributes capital to the capital of the 
corporation in order to generate a profit.  Id.  But see Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the 
Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 184–85 (1998) (comparing 
principles of source based taxation to those of benefit theory taxation). 
34 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 5 (2003) (distinguishing between residence and source 
taxation).  There is much difficulty in defining residence and source, which creates 
problems in international taxation.  Id.  See also Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & 
Robert J. Peroni, “What’s Source Got to do With It?”  Source Rules and U.S. International 
Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 90–92 (2002) (explaining that source based taxation represents 
the price paid for access to state markets, while residence based taxation represents the 
benefits associated with being a citizen of that state). 
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B. Basic Corporate Taxation Framework 
There are two major types of taxation systems for international 
corporations:  (1) the territorial system and (2) the worldwide system.35  
The territorial system, also known as the source system, taxes income 
that is derived within a particular country.36  This means that a 
corporation is taxed by a country if the corporation earns its income 
within the country’s borders, irrespective of the corporation’s 
residency.37 
In a worldwide system, a corporation is taxed on its worldwide 
income based on its “residence,” regardless of where the income is 
actually earned.38  Accordingly, a corporation is taxed only if it is a 
“resident” of a particular country.39  Some countries deem a corporation 
a resident based on where its headquarters are located; however, most 
                                                 
35 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 411 
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (explaining the main ways that people and 
corporations are subject to tax in the United States); id. § 412(1)(a) (stating that no matter 
the source of the income, the United States has authority to tax based on residence); 
GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 12–13 (outlining the basics of a pure territorial tax system and a 
pure worldwide tax system). 
36 See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION:  A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 347–49 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the positives and negatives of both 
the source and residence tax systems); GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 12–17 (discussing different 
rationales for worldwide and territorial tax systems); Barker, supra note 29, at 664–65 
(highlighting some factors that connect a nation’s tax base to the taxing jurisdiction). 
37 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 12–13 (explaining the importance of the source income 
concept in international taxation).  The principal right to tax usually lies with the source 
country, and the burden of preventing the corporation from being taxed twice on the 
income—from the source country and the residence country—is on the resident country.  
Id. at 13.  See also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in 
International Taxation:  The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 
299, 303 (2001) (illustrating that source based taxation does not take into account the 
residence of the corporation); Timothy Hisao Shapiro, Tax First, Ask Questions Later:  
Problems Predicting the Effect of President Obama’s International Tax Reforms, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 141, 149–50 (2010) (explaining the basics of both worldwide and territorial taxation). 
38 See Daniel Shaviro, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 65, 66 
(2011) (maintaining that in a worldwide system, the United States taxes the income of 
residents no matter where it arose); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of 
International Taxation:  A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1311–14 (1996) 
(providing several reasons for preferring residency-based taxation over source based 
taxation). 
39 See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30)(C) (2006) (defining the term “United States Person” as “a 
domestic corporation”); Daniel Shaviro, The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 
64 TAX L. REV. 377, 383 (2011) (“A corporation is a U.S. resident if and only if it is ‘created 
or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State.’”). 
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countries, including the United States, use place of incorporation as the 
test for corporate residence.40 
Like most other industrialized countries, the United States employs a 
system of taxation that combines both the territorial and the worldwide 
tax systems.41  The United States taxes corporations if they are 
incorporated in the United States and also taxes foreign corporations if 
the income is earned within the United States.42  Thus, the only way that 
a corporation will not incur any U.S. tax is if the company is a foreign 
                                                 
40 See Shaviro, supra note 39, at 413 (“A number of countries base corporate residence on 
some version of an inquiry into the location of a given company’s headquarters, or its place 
of central management and control.”). 
41 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 13 (explaining that the United States tax system is 
referred to by most as a worldwide system, because the United States taxes foreign source 
income even though it is not quite a pure system).  The author explains: 
Sometimes analysts distinguish systems that tax foreign-source income 
from those that do not.  They often call the former “worldwide 
systems” and the latter “territorial systems.”  No country, however 
employs a pure “worldwide system” or a pure “territorial system.”  
International tax regimes throughout the world are hybrid or “mixed” 
systems. 
Id. 
42 See I.R.C. §§ 881(a), 882(a) (2010) (imposing tax on foreign corporations that generate 
or derive their income within the United States); id. § 63 (2010) (imposing tax on U.S. 
corporations); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, 
Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes:  A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. 
TAX REV. 497, 499–500 (2009) (examining some specifics in the U.S. tax system).  An 
example is provided: 
 The U.S. government taxes U.S. multinational firms on a 
residence basis, and thus U.S. resident firms incur taxation on income 
earned abroad as well as income earned in the United States.  U.S. 
taxation is imposed only when income is repatriated by a foreign 
subsidiary to the U.S. parent via a dividend.  Thus, a subsidiary’s 
income can grow free of U.S. tax prior to repatriation, a process known 
as deferral.  Deferral provides strong incentives to earn income in low-
tax countries. 
 As an example, consider a U.S. based multinational firm that 
operates a subsidiary in Ireland.  Assume that the U.S. corporate 
income tax rate is 35% while the Irish corporate income tax rate is 
12.5%.  The Irish subsidiary earns 800 and decides to repatriate 70 of 
the profits to the United States.  (Assume, for ease of computation 
only, a 1:1 exchange rate.)  First, the Irish affiliate pays 100 to the Irish 
government on profits of 800.  It then repatriates $70 to the United 
States, using the remaining profit (630) to reinvest in its Irish 
operations.  The firm must pay U.S. tax on the repatriated income, but 
it is generally eligible for a tax credit of $100 (taxes paid) times 70/700 
(the ratio of dividends to after-tax profits), or $10.  Owing to deferral, 
the remaining profits (630) can grow abroad tax-free prior to 
repatriation. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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corporation and has not earned any income in the United States.43  If the 
parent corporation is based in the United States and has foreign 
subsidiaries, then the income earned by these subsidiaries is not taxed 
until it is repatriated to the U.S. parent via dividends or some other 
financial alternative.44  Therefore, the current tax base for U.S. 
corporations is net income, and the tax base for foreign corporations is 
income earned within the United States—both of which are separately 
reported to the IRS, which means that the only reason to report is to 
determine tax liability.45  These current tax bases represent the general 
pools of wealth that are subject to taxation—those numbers are then 
subject to thousands of pages of complex tax code and Treasury 
Regulations, which attempt to resolve a seemingly never-ending amount 
of issues, including:  regulating certain actors, monitoring specific 
transactions, and reconciling U.S. law with other international taxing 
jurisdictions by issuing credits.46 
                                                 
43 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 40 (explaining how the United States generally does not 
have taxing authority over foreign based residents with foreign source income). 
44 See I.R.C. § 881 (2010) (providing for taxation of foreign corporations that repatriate 
their income to a U.S. parent corporation); Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 42, at 499 
(examining some specifics in the U.S. tax system).  The process of companies keeping funds 
in their overseas subsidiaries and not repatriating until they need capital is known as 
deferral.  Id.  The reasoning behind this is that the money earned by the subsidiary is 
attributed to a foreign corporation until it is repatriated to the U.S. parent.  Id.  See also 
William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax Sparing, and 
Development:  It is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 349, 353–54 (2007) (“Under a 
residence-based system like the one used in the United States, as long as home country 
[corporations] use the form of foreign corporations to carry out their activities, income is 
deferred until repatriated and, upon repatriation of the profits, the enterprise is still 
entitled to a credit for foreign taxes previously paid.”); Shapiro, supra note 37, at 150 
(noting that U.S. corporations are able to defer recognition of their foreign-source income, 
lowering their effective tax rate); supra note 42 (giving an example of repatriation and the 
foreign tax credit). 
45 See Noël B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 
TAX L. REV. 17, 17–18 (1996) (explaining the difference between having an income or 
consumption tax base); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 717 
(2011) (describing the current U.S. corporate tax base of net income as worldwide, except 
for income earned by U.S. subsidiaries and not repatriated); Edward J. McCaffery & James 
R. Hines Jr., The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031, 1041 (2010) 
(explaining that having a certain tax base affects the particular tax rate a jurisdiction sets); 
Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future:  A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International 
Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 976 (1997) (supporting the U.S. tax base of net 
income for the foreseeable future); Holmes, supra note 9, at 4 (explaining that the shifting of 
income out of the United States has eroded the corporate tax base because it has removed a 
large part of potential tax revenue to other countries with lower tax rates); see also Barker, 
supra note 29, at 651–52 (explaining the three different aspects of the tax base and how they 
are all inter-related). 
46 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a 
Global Economy:  A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment 5 (Brookings Inst., Discussion 
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To prevent double taxation, the United States gives a foreign tax 
credit to U.S. corporations if they earn income abroad.47  For example, if 
a U.S. corporation earns income in a foreign country and that country 
imposes a territorial tax (as most countries do), then that corporation will 
receive a credit for the taxes paid.48  The U.S. corporation would only 
owe the United States the difference between the U.S. rate and the 
foreign territorial taxes paid, unless the foreign rate was higher, at which 
point the corporation would not be subject to any U.S. tax.49  The main 
                                                                                                             
Paper, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/ 
2007/6/corporatetaxes%20clausing/200706clausing_aviyonah.PDF (“The U.S. system is 
also notoriously complex:  observers are nearly unanimous in lamenting the heavy 
compliance burdens and the impracticality of coherent enforcement.”); Holmes, supra note 
9, at 6–7 (describing the complexity of the U.S. Tax Code as many bright line rules aimed at 
various goals that lack uniformity); see also David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 871 (1999) (explaining that the more tax laws there are, the more 
transactional costs there are to ensure that those laws work together and that they do not 
allow for any loopholes). 
47 See I.R.C. §§ 901–08 (2010) (providing the rules governing the foreign tax credit for 
U.S. corporations); see also Zelinsky, supra note 31, at 1297 (providing a simplified example 
of the foreign tax credit system).  That example is provided below: 
 To see the operation of the foreign income tax credit, suppose a 
highly simplified example in which A, a U.S. citizen, is in a 30% federal 
income tax bracket and earns $100 from renting his condominium in 
Country X.  If X has no income tax, A, on her federal return, reports 
this rental income as part of her worldwide income and pays $30 of 
such income to the federal fisc.  If, on the other hand, X also imposes 
income taxes on A at a 30% bracket, A pays a $30 income tax to X, the 
source jurisdiction, and then credits that $30 paid against the tax A 
would otherwise owe to the United States.  The result is no net 
payment by A to the U.S. Treasury.  If, in contrast, X imposes income 
taxes on A at a 20% bracket, A pays a $20 tax to X, takes a credit on her 
federal tax return for that $20 income tax payment, and thereby pays a 
net tax to the United States of $10 on her rental income from her 
condominium located in X.  The conventional view is that the credit for 
foreign income taxes prevents double taxation by giving the source 
jurisdiction the priority to tax. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
48 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse than Exemption, 59 
EMORY L.J. 79, 81 (2009) (explaining the fundamentals of the foreign tax credit system). 
Under the foreign tax credit system, the residence country subtracts 
the source-country tax on a resident’s foreign income from the 
residence-country tax on the resident’s foreign income and collects a 
so-called residual tax to the extent that the residence-country tax 
exceeds the source-country tax.  Where a resident’s source-country tax 
exceeds the residence-country tax, however, the residence country 
does not refund the excess to the resident. 
Id. 
49 Id.; see Jane G. Gravelle, International Corporate Income Tax Reform:  Issues and Proposals, 
9 FLA. TAX REV. 469, 473 (2009) (“[I]f foreign taxes exceed the U.S. tax that would be due, 
the excess foreign taxes cannot be credited.”). 
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policy reasons behind creating the foreign tax credit were to encourage 
corporations to continue to form and operate in the United States and to 
attract foreign investment in these corporations by eliminating the 
negative effect of double taxation.50  However, corporations have found 
ways to manipulate their tax credits, shielding their income and paying a 
lower overall effective tax rate.51  The foreign tax credit system also 
depends, in large part, on accurately identifying the source of the 
income—which has proved to be difficult with the globalization of the 
economy.52 
As the global economy has evolved, most tax rules have become 
more complicated and harder to implement.53  The residence rules have 
become much easier to manipulate because of how simple it is to 
incorporate in another country.54  Even if a corporation decides not to 
                                                 
50 See Raquel Alexander, Stephen W. Mazza & Susan Scholz, Measuring Rates of Return on 
Lobbying Expenditures:  An Empirical Case Study of Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations, 
25 J.L. & POL’Y 401, 411 (2009) (describing how corporations are able to defer U.S. tax on 
income derived by a foreign subsidiary until the parent corporation repatriates the 
income).  See generally Michael S. Kirsch, The Role of Physical Presence in the Taxation of Cross-
Border Personal Services, 51 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1025 (2010) (providing a very broad description 
of the foreign tax credit system). 
51 See Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax:  A New Approach to Tax 
Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 924–25 (2007) 
(explaining the process of using foreign tax credits to shield income).  The shielding 
process involves racking up a high amount of foreign tax credits in a low-tax jurisdiction to 
shield that income from being taxed at a higher rate in another jurisdiction.  Id. 
52 See I.R.C. §§ 861, 862, 863, 865 (2006) (providing the statutory rules governing how the 
United States determines the source of income); INT’L BUREAU FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, 
INTERNATIONAL TAX GLOSSARY 277 (3d ed. 1996) (providing that a source of income is the 
“country or countries from which the company derived its profits”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483, 490 (2004) (“The special problem of 
territoriality in the tax area is that the source of income is very difficult to define.”). 
53 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–
60 (1992) (examining the differences between tax standards and tax laws).  The problem 
with tax laws is that their ideal content is not immediately apparent, and they are 
promulgated after the fact.  Id. at 569.  See also Kenneth W. Gideon, Cutler & Pickering 
Wilmer, Tax Law Works Best when the Rules are Clear, 81 TAX NOTES 999, 1001 (1998) (arguing 
that tax law problems need to be confronted and solved before they occur so the laws do 
not continue to get more complex). 
54 See I.R.C. §§ 7701(a)(4)–(5) (2006) (explaining that the term “domestic,” when applied 
to a corporation, means created or organized under the laws of the United States and the 
term “foreign,” when applied to corporations, means one that is not domestic); William M. 
Funk, On and over the Horizon:  Emerging Issues in U.S. Taxation of Investments, 10 HOUS. BUS. 
& TAX L.J. 1, 30–31 (2010) (noting that the United States corporate residence test is unusual 
because it is based on form rather than substance, which encourages tax avoidance); David 
R. Tillinghast, A Matter of Definition:  “Foreign” and “Domestic” Taxpayers, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. 
LAW. 239, 259–60 (1984) (explaining the positives and negatives of the United States using 
the place of incorporation to determine a corporation’s residence).  The one advantage of 
the place of incorporation test is that it is very easy to apply.  Id.  It is applied by referring 
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change its country of incorporation, it could set up a foreign subsidiary, 
incorporate in that foreign jurisdiction, and transfer its income through 
financial record manipulation.55 
The source rules have been criticized for containing inherent 
problems in their application.56  In order to determine the source of the 
income, the IRS has developed bright line rules that apply to different 
types of income, different parties depending on their residence, and 
exemptions.  However, these rules are easily manipulated.57  Also, issues 
                                                                                                             
to the jurisdiction in which the charter is filed and by the laws governing the shareholders.  
Id. at 260.  The major drawback of the place of incorporation test is that it is by nature 
androgynous and creates progeny.  Id.  Once a decision to incorporate in the United States 
is made, tax restraints discourage a company from incorporating abroad, but there are not 
restraints hindering the subsidiary of a U.S. corporation from incorporating abroad.  Id. 
55 See Edward Kofi Osei, Transfer Pricing in Comparative Perspective and the Need for 
Reforms in Ghana, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 599, 603 (2010) (identifying a few 
major U.S. corporations that set up subsidiaries in lower tax jurisdictions); Jon M. Truby, 
Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental Tax Leakage and Border Tax 
Adjustment Concessions for Developing Countries, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 165–67 (2010) 
(providing four examples of different ways that corporations set up subsidiaries in lower 
tax jurisdictions); Jesse Drucker, Forest Laboratories’ Globe-Trotting Profits, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (May 13, 2010), http://www.businessweek/magazine/content/10_21/ 
b4179062992003.htm (explaining that thousands of U.S. companies are using subsidiaries in 
other countries and describing some of the techniques that they are using). 
56 See I.R.C. §§ 861–63, 865 (2006) (providing the U.S. source rules); GRAETZ, supra note 
30, at 41 (explaining problems associated with the U.S. source rules).  An example is 
provided: 
 Suppose a company manufactures and sells bicycles.  Its owners 
live in Japan; its factory is in Mexico; its main offices are in Canada; its 
principle sales office is in the U.S., where most of its bicycles are sold; 
and it is incorporated in Bermuda.  The geographical source of income 
from its bicycle sales is far from clear.  On one hand, the Japanese 
owners supplied the capital to create the company, and the U.S. 
provides its principal market.  But Mexico provides the bulk of its 
labor, Canada is the locus of its management, and Bermuda provides 
the legal arrangements enabling the company to exist. 
Id.  See also Fred B. Brown, An Equity-Based, Multilateral Approach for Sourcing Income Among 
Nations, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 565, 579–83 (2011) (pointing out that the two major problems with 
the current U.S. source rules are that they lack coherence to achieve a consistent tax policy, 
and there is such a variation between the U.S. rules and the rules of other developed 
countries). 
57 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 55–56 (explaining source rule manipulation).  “Two 
prevalent types of source rule manipulation are the shifting of source within a particular 
category of income and the recharacterization of income into a different source category 
altogether.”  Id.  An example of the former is shifting income between passive and active 
because they are taxed differently.  Id.  An example of the latter is shifting income to capital 
gains.  Id.  See also Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 1331 (“[T]he current [source] rules place an 
immense premium on [how] payments are characterized . . . . [T]hese distinctions require 
constant policing, and much of the complexity of the inbound rules of the Code stems from 
this problem.”); Charles I. Kingson, Taxing the Future, 51 TAX L. REV. 641, 642 (1996) 
(explaining how income is sometimes characterized as royalties, service, sales, or interest). 
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with determining the source have grown even more with technology, e-
commerce, and intellectual property.58  Difficulties arise when attributing 
the source of an Internet transaction and when determining the source of 
income produced by an algorithm or some other type of intellectual 
property.59  The U.S. corporate tax structure has opened up loopholes for 
a few popular tax avoidance methods that corporations like to exploit.60  
This Note explains the fundamentals of each popular strategy by using 
Google as a structural example.61  Although there are many corporations 
that utilize these tax avoidance techniques, each has its own specific 
version.62  Google’s tax avoidance process illuminates the basics of 
several different methods employed to take advantage of multiple 
international tax loopholes simultaneously.63 
                                                 
58 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 527 (explaining how easy it is for corporations to 
establish their business and income in tax havens); Yariv Brauner, An International Tax 
Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 312 (2003) (explaining that the source and 
resident rules are “fairly easy to exploit in the e-commerce context”); Thomas C. Pearson, 
Proposed International Legal Reforms for Reducing Transfer Pricing Manipulation of Intellectual 
Property, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 541, 562–63 (2008) (describing the problem with 
intellectual property and abusing tax avoidance); Kyrie E. Thorpe, Comment, International 
Taxation of Electronic Commerce:  Is the Internet Age Rendering the Concept of Permanent 
Establishment Obsolete?, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 633, 639–40 (1997) (describing how 
corporations earning money through e-commerce transactions can avoid source taxes by 
locating their servers in countries with a lower tax rate); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-4(b)(1) (as 
amended in 2006) (providing the regulations governing the transfer of intellectual 
property, such as inventions, formula, processes, designs, and patterns). 
59 See Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593, 
599 (2010) (“Common transfer pricing strategies include the location of valuable intellectual 
property in low-tax offshore corporations . . . .”).  The I.R.S. has tried to fix this problem by 
changing regulations to require the sharing of a larger pool of costs and to attribute a 
higher value to intellectual property originating with the parent company.  Id. at 627.  
There have also been proposals to tax U.S. corporations on excess returns from intangibles 
placed in low-tax jurisdictions.  Id.  The problem with this proposal is that it is very hard to 
put a value on intellectual property to properly determine what is in excess.  Id. 
60 See Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation:  Understanding the Corporate 
“Conscience”, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129, 1154–55 (2008) (stating that the use of loopholes 
allows corporations to comply with the letter, but not necessarily the spirit, of a law, which 
in turn gives them the ability to manipulate and exploit the legal system); see also infra Part 
II.C (explaining four major tax avoidance techniques used by corporations); Gary Clyde 
Hufbauer & Jisun Kim, U.S. Taxation of Multinational Corporations:  What Makes Sense, What 
Doesn’t 4 (Peterson Inst. Int’l Econ., Policy Brief No. PB09-7, 2009), available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=1152 (noting the loopholes 
in the U.S. tax system). 
61 See infra Part II.C (using Google as the example in each section to provide an example 
of the type of tax avoidance structures that corporations employ). 
62 See, e.g., Kleinbard, supra note 45, at 763 (explaining Cisco’s strategies for tax 
avoidance). 
63 See Gravelle, supra note 22, at 76 (discussing why Google uses so many different types 
of loopholes in its tax avoidance scheme). 
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C. Major Tax Avoidance Techniques 
Recent technological innovations, as well as a movement towards a 
global economy, have enabled corporations to take advantage of the U.S. 
tax system, avoiding taxation.64  Part II.C.1 explains the use of shell 
companies; Part II.C.2 examines the earnings stripping technique; Part 
II.C.3 provides details about transfer pricing; and Part II.C.4 combines 
the three strategies to show how Google is manipulating the U.S. tax 
system.65 
1. Shell Companies 
One major technique being used by U.S. corporations occurs when a 
company sets up shell companies, companies with little or no assets, as 
subsidiaries in tax shelters or countries with low tax rates.66  This usually 
involves establishing an office or even just a mailbox in a low-tax 
country and then either incorporating in that country or claiming that its 
office in that country is its central place of management.67  Corporations 
                                                 
64 See supra note 3 (describing how technology has made it easier for corporations to get 
around tax laws); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial 
Services Industry, 1975–2000:  Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 215, 467 (2002) (explaining how technological improvements made it easier for 
corporations to get around financial services requirements). 
65 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the use of shell companies); infra Part II.C.2 (explaining 
the use of earnings stripping); infra Part II.C.3 (examining the practice of transfer pricing); 
infra Part II.C.4 (defining and explaining the “Double Dutch Irish Sandwich”). 
66  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(3)(iv) (2010) (providing a definition of a shell company); 
Simone M. Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions:  A 
Comparative Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 250 (1996) (maintaining that shell 
corporations follow the sham doctrine in which no real business or activity is going on in 
them); Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding:  A Comparative Study and 
Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 160 (1990) (explaining the basic strategy of 
filtering money through a shell company); Press Release, supra note 4 (noting that shell 
companies are created for the sole reason of saving money on taxes); see also John Hasnas, 
Between Scylla and Charybdis:  Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel in the World of the Holder 
Memorandum, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1199, 1211–12 (2010) (explaining that tax shelters are 
designed to allow wealthy investors to avoid paying taxes); David E. Spencer & Jason C. 
Sharman, OECD Proposals on Harmful Tax Practices, 13 N.Z. J. TAX’N L. & POL’Y 129, 148 
(2007) (giving details on how criminals use shell companies to house funds derived from 
criminal activity). 
67 See 60 minutes Special Report:  A Look at the World’s New Corporate Tax Havens, 
CBSNEWS.COM (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/03/25/ 
60minutes/main20046867.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody (describing certain 
companies that employ these techniques in Switzerland).  Central place of management is 
another test that countries use for establishing whether a corporation is a resident for tax 
purposes.  See Aldo Forgione, Weaving the Continental Web:  Exploring Free trade, Taxation, 
and the Internet, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 513, 534 (2003) (exploring the different ways countries 
define a corporation).  Forgione provides a brief summary: 
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do this because they can take advantage of the lower tax rates, 
repatriating just enough money in order to keep their U.S. parent 
companies running.68  For example, Google, Inc., a U.S. based 
corporation, created a subsidiary in the Netherlands, Google 
Netherlands Holdings, which has no employees or assets but filters 
through 99.8% of Google’s income for tax reasons.69 
One preventive measure that the IRS employed to stop this type of 
behavior was the subpart F rules, or the Controlled Foreign Corporations 
(“CFC”) regulations, as part of the 1962 Tax Revenue Act.70  These 
regulations identified corporate forms that were more prone to tax 
avoidance and specified several categories of income that would be 
subject to U.S. income tax, because certain types of income could easily 
                                                                                                             
While many nations define a resident corporation, for tax purposes, as 
a company incorporated in the state, a significant number of countries 
have also enacted laws that purport to deem a corporation to be a 
resident of the country if the company’s place of central management 
is located domestically or, more rarely, if the corporation’s principal 
economic activities are conducted locally. 
Id.  The central place of management test looks more to the substance rather than the form 
of the corporation.  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 52, at 486 (explaining the advantages and 
disadvantages of the central place of management test used in the United Kingdom). 
68 See Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law:  U.S. Progressivism 
and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354, 386 (2011) (“When a foreign-chartered 
corporation is owned by a U.S. corporation, the result is that profits attributable to U.S. 
shareholders escape U.S. tax as long as they are reinvested in foreign tax jurisdictions; 
hence the frequent establishment of subsidiaries in low-tax foreign jurisdictions.”); Avi-
Yonah et al., supra note 42, at 499–500 (examining some specifics in the U.S. tax system and 
noting how the U.S. system creates an incentive for corporations to earn profits in countries 
with lower tax rates).  The process of companies keeping funds in their overseas 
subsidiaries and not repatriating them until they need capital is known as deferral.  Id.  
Companies employ this tactic because the money earned by the subsidiary is deemed to be 
of a foreign corporation until it is attributed to the U.S. parent.  Id. 
69 See Gravelle, supra note 22, at 76 (describing the scheme that Google uses, which is 
commonly referred to as the “Double Irish” with a “Dutch Sandwich”); Jesse Drucker, The 
Tax Haven That’s Saving Google Billions, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_44/b4201043146825.htm 
(explaining the entire process that Google goes through in order to cut their effective 
corporate tax rate from 35% to 2.4%). 
70 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 956(d), 76 Stat. 960 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 I.R.C.); see I.R.C. § 957 (2006) (defining a controlled foreign 
corporation in the Tax Code); GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 218 (defining a “controlled foreign 
corporation” or “CFC” as a “foreign corporation that is majority owned by U.S. individuals 
or corporations, counting only those U.S. shareholders who hold 10% or more of the 
stock”); Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck 
in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1538–40 (2001) (explaining the history of 
subpart F and how President Kennedy’s administration worked to enact it); Adam H. 
Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 974–76 (2010) 
(examining the history of the subpart F regulations and why they were enacted). 
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be shifted to low-tax jurisdictions.71  Under these rules, specific U.S. 
corporations are taxed to the extent that their foreign subsidiaries 
received disfavored forms of income, which were most likely aimed at 
shifting income.72  Corporations, such as Google, are still finding ways to 
manipulate their form, circumventing the controlled foreign corporation 
label.73  These rules are objective, mechanical, and designed to isolate 
income typically associated with tax avoidance.74  This has led to layers 
upon layers of technical rules aimed at retroactively fixing a specific 
problem; however, these rules simultaneously create another loophole.75 
2. Earnings Stripping 
Earnings Stripping is a tax avoidance technique in which a U.S. 
corporation sets up a subsidiary in a low-tax country, and then the U.S. 
corporation uses its U.S. earnings and makes deductible payments to the 
                                                 
71 See Charles E. McLure Jr., Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law, and Cooperative Approaches to 
Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the U.S. and the E.U., 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 377, 389 
(2008) (explaining how CFC regulations target certain corporations that are prone to shift 
their income); GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 218 (noting that most controlled foreign 
corporations were formed for the sole reason of moving their passive income); see also 
I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)–(2) (2006) (codifying the different types of income that the subpart F 
regulations apply to); Engel, supra note 70, at 1542–48 (examining the major categories of 
income targeted under Subpart F including:  passive income, diversionary sales income, 
diversionary services income, and miscellaneous provisions).  The biggest category that 
companies abuse is passive income, which includes dividends, interest, rents, royalties, 
stocks, and securities.  Id. at 1542. 
72 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 220 (maintaining that the disfavored forms of business 
income include income involving structures that shift income outside a foreign subsidiary’s 
place of incorporation with little or no economic cost); see also supra note 71 (naming types 
of income to which controlled foreign corporation regulations are aimed). 
73 See I.R.C. § 957 (2006) (providing that a corporation is considered a “controlled foreign 
corporation” when a certain percentage of stock is owned by U.S. shareholders).  If 
subsidiaries are owned by means other than stock, then these controlled foreign 
corporation regulations can be avoided.  Id.  See also GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 236 
(explaining a few other ways that controlled foreign corporation regulations can be 
avoided).  Corporations avoid these regulations by becoming a hybrid entity and 
transferring income inter-branch.  Id.  Another way to avoid these regulations is contracting 
out the actual processing or manufacturing into a low-tax jurisdiction.  Id. at 236–37. 
74 See sources cited supra note 50 (explaining why tax laws in the United States appear to 
be so complicated); see also Ilya A. Lipin, Uncertain Tax Positions and the New Tax Policy of 
Disclosure Through the Schedule UTP, 30 VA. TAX REV. 663, 665–67 (2011) (explaining that 
U.S. tax laws contain ambiguities, obscurities, and perplexities, which make their 
interaction and application to specific situations incoherent and complex). 
75 See Lipin, supra note 74, at 665–67 (explaining that there are over seventy thousand 
pages of tax code that have been changed over fifteen thousand times, with each new 
change creating an opportunity for exploitation); see also sources cited supra note 50 
(providing an explanation for why the U.S. Tax Code is so difficult to apply). 
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subsidiary in the form of interest, royalties, or fees. 76  This “strips” the 
earnings from the U.S. corporation and transfers the majority of the 
income to the country with the low tax rate.77  For example, the foreign 
subsidiary could make a loan to the U.S. parent, and in return the parent 
would make extremely high interest payments back to the subsidiary.78  
In 2006, Google, Inc. (U.S.) implemented a form of earnings stripping 
when it licensed the rights of its intellectual property to its subsidiary in 
Bermuda for “undisclosed” fees.79  These fees are ongoing and are set 
very low in order to capture as much profit as possible in Bermuda, 
which does not have a corporate income tax.80 
                                                 
76 See Press Release, supra note 4 (describing the process that corporations go through in 
order to shift their income to subsidiaries in countries with lower tax rates).  Traditionally, 
if a U.S. company sets up a foreign subsidiary in a tax haven and one in another country, 
income shifted between the two subsidiaries—for example, through interest on loans—
would be considered “passive income” for the U.S. company and subject to U.S. tax.  Id.  
Over the last decade, it has become easier for U.S. firms to make these subsidiaries 
disappear for U.S. tax purposes.  Id.  With the separate subsidiaries disregarded, the firm 
can shift income among them without reporting any passive income or paying any U.S. tax.  
Id.  As a result, U.S. firms that invest overseas are able to shift their income to tax havens.  
Id.  “It is clear that this loophole, while legal, has become a reason to shift billions of dollars 
in investments from the United States to other counties.”  Id.  See also Ilan Benshalom, 
Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Hybrid Formulary and 
Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV. 619, 641–42 (2009) (acknowledging that the 
traditional earnings stripping technique involved debt, but also maintaining that it could 
be replicated using other types of related transactions); Robert E. Culbertson & Jaime E. 
King, U.S. Rules on Earnings Stripping:  Background, Structure, and Treaty Interaction, 29 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 1161, 1161–62, 1166–68 (2003) (explaining the background of earnings 
stripping); Kleinbard, supra note 45, at 703 (defining earnings stripping as “the extraction of 
pretax earnings from a source country through tax-deductible payments to offshore 
affiliates”). 
77 See Culbertson & King, supra note 76, at 1161–68 (explaining that foreign investors can 
take advantage of debt structuring to strip their earnings to a low-tax jurisdiction); 
Kleinbard, supra note 45, at 706 (noting that earnings stripping is a type of leveraging 
technique that strips countries of attributable tax revenue). 
78 See Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree:  Doctrine, 
Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (2010) 
(“Remarkably, the current rules are ineffective even in preventing tax revenue loss because 
they fail to recognize the weakest link in terms of tax erosion—interest payments made to 
foreign investors.”); Kleinbard, supra note 45, at 705 (explaining that earnings stripping 
usually occurs through the creation of an item of income inclusion, such as intercompany 
interest, rents, or royalties). 
79 See Drucker, supra note 69 (explaining Google’s entire tax avoidance strategy); see 
Gravelle, supra note 22, at 76 (giving a brief summary of Google’s tax avoidance process); 
Kleinbard, supra note 45, at 711–12 (explaining that the earnings stripping step in Google’s 
tax avoidance process is the last step after which most of its income comes to rest in 
Bermuda). 
80 Drucker, supra note 69.  Drucker goes on to explain: 
The subsidiary is supposed to pay an “arm’s length” price for the 
rights, or the same amount an unrelated company would.  Yet because 
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One way that Congress tried to stop this type of behavior was by 
passing the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, which codified the 
earnings stripping rule as section 163(j) of the Tax Code.81  Under this 
regulation, certain rules applied to corporations with debt/equity ratios 
greater than 1.5 to 1.82  In other words, if the company was structured so 
that it paid out more than half of its cash flow as interest expenses, then 
the interest payments would be treated as excess interest and not interest 
income for taxing purposes.83  Corporations are still able to manipulate 
and restructure to make their ratios appear lower than they actually 
are.84  This rule is also aimed specifically at earnings stripping involving 
debt and does not consider earnings stripping involving other forms of 
intercompany payments, such as Google’s use of fees.85 
3. Transfer Pricing 
Transfer pricing is probably the most used tax avoidance strategy, 
which involves the setting of prices in transactions between related 
entities.86  A common example occurs when a U.S. parent corporation 
                                                                                                             
licensing fees from the Irish subsidiary generate income that is taxed at 
35 percent, one of the highest corporate rates in the world, Google has 
an incentive to set the licensing price as low as possible. 
Id. 
81 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–239, § 7210(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 
2339; I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A)–(C) (2006) (describing the earnings stripping rules for 
corporations); Julie A. Roin, Adding Insult to Injury:  The “Enhancement” of S 163(J) and the 
Tax Treatment of Foreign Investors in the United States, 49 TAX L. REV. 269, 270 (1994) 
(commenting that section 163(J) is known as the “earnings stripping rule” because it 
prevents shareholders from using interest payments to strip corporations of their earnings). 
82 See I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A)–(C) (2006) (providing the statutory rules designed to prevent 
corporations from abusing the debt to equity form in order to avoid paying taxes). 
83 See Culbertson & King, supra note 76, at 1167–68 (explaining section 163(J) represents 
the principle that a corporation should not be able to filter its income through interest or 
any other kind of intra-company payments to reduce its tax liability). 
84 See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter:  An Explanation for “Dirty 
Pooling” and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 168–70 (1997) 
(explaining that companies use debt/equity swaps and other transactions to manipulate 
their ratio for a purely cosmetic effect).  Not only will the company be able to bypass the 
earnings stripping rules, but it also will look more attractive to future investors.  Id. 
85 See I.R.C. § 163(j)(2)(A)–(C) (giving the rules associated with stopping earnings 
stripping).  These rules do not contain any regulations for fees, rents, or royalties and only 
relate to earnings stripping by debt.  Id.  See also Benshalom, supra note 76, at 641 
(mentioning how earnings stripping could also be accomplished by manipulating a variety 
of different financial transactions). 
86 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 400 (explaining that the common transfer pricing strategy 
involves income that is earned by a high tax rate entity being somehow realized by a 
subsidiary that pays tax at a lower rate).  Corporations that own subsidiaries in low-tax 
jurisdictions usually engage in transfer pricing to shift income through the manufacturing 
process without lowering the overall economic profit per transaction.  Id. at 401.  See About 
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interacts with a foreign subsidiary, and that subsidiary sells either goods 
or services abroad.87  The U.S. corporation can then “sell,” on paper, the 
product to its foreign subsidiary for a minimum price so that most of the 
profit is captured in the foreign country with the lower tax rate.88  
Transfer pricing is a problem because there is not one globally 
recognized tax code, and corporations are always searching for ways to 
maximize profit.89  Google, Inc. (U.S.) also employs a form of transfer 
pricing, in which it licenses its search and advertising technology to 
Google Ireland in return for licensing payments.90  The licensing 
                                                                                                             
Transfer Pricing, OECD CTR. TAX POL’Y & ADMIN. (last updated July 2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transferpricing/abouttransferpricing.htm (explaining the 
process of transfer pricing generally); see also Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing 
Problem:  A Global Proposal for Simplification, 59 TAX LAW. 941, 949 (2006) (defining transfer 
price as “the unit price assigned to goods and services between the parent company and 
subsidiaries or between divisions within the same firm”). 
87 See John Sokatch, Transfer-Pricing with Software Allows for Effective Circumvention of Sub-
Part F Income:  Google’s “Sandwich” Costs Taxpayers Millions, 45 INT’L LAW. 725, 739 (2011) 
(“Transfer-pricing is the practice of making payments from one business entity to another 
affiliated business entity for the receipt of goods or services.”). 
88 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 400 (explaining transfer pricing and the allocation of 
income among related parties).  An example is provided: 
 Suppose that Company A, a U.S. corporation, manufactures 
contact lenses.  Most of Company A’s product is sold abroad through a 
wholly owned subsidiary, Company B.  Each lens costs $5 to 
manufacture and is sold to the public abroad for $9 by Company B.  
Suppose that Company B is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company 
A, then Company A may, by controlling the sales price of the lenses, be 
able to choose in which jurisdiction its taxable income is realized.  
Company A may attempt to realize the bulk of its income in the 
foreign jurisdiction by selling contact lenses to Company B for say, 
$5.25, resulting in a token profit of $0.25 per lens in the U.S.  Company 
B will realize profit of $3.75 per lens ($9.00 minus the $5.25 it paid for 
each lens from Company A).  Absent a challenge by the IRS, for the 
purpose of allocating income from the sales of each lens for 
determining income tax owed, the profit will be split between 
Companies A and B, with only 25 cents of profit realized in the U.S. 
and $3.75 in Company B’s low-tax jurisdiction for each lens produced 
and sold. 
Id. 
89 See Miguel González Marcos, Seclusion in (Fiscal) Paradise is Not an Option:  The OECD 
Harmful Tax Practices Initiative and Offshore Financial Centers, 24 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 22–23 
(2011) (explaining that tax policies are efficient if they minimize tax considerations in 
corporations’ decision making); Sokatch, supra note 87, at 739 (noting that corporations and 
consumers always search for ways to “re-capture” profits that would normally be 
attributed to taxes); see also Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the 
“Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 31–32 (2005) (explaining the main 
goals of a corporation). 
90 See Kleinbard, supra note 45, at 707 (noting that Google Ireland Holdings operated 
with five total employees in 2003); Sokatch, supra note 87, at 740 (explaining that Google 
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agreement allows Google to attribute its overseas profits to its Irish 
operations, instead of the United States where most of the technology 
was developed.91 
One way that the IRS tried to combat transfer pricing was through 
the Arm’s Length Standard.92  This standard states that “in determining 
the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be 
applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an 
uncontrolled taxpayer.”93  This standard is met if uncontrolled taxpayers 
would have engaged in the same transactions under the same 
circumstances.94  However, this standard creates uncertainty because 
neither the taxpayer nor the market can predict in advance what a 
reasonable outcome should be in a transfer pricing case, especially for 
unique goods.95 
4. Putting It All Together—Google’s “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” 
These three techniques all involve methods of manipulating financial 
statements to lower income, but Google has combined these three 
methods, creating what has become known as the “Double Irish Dutch 
                                                                                                             
Ireland Holdings is in control of Google’s “search engine software, advertising banners, 
and the Android platform”). 
91 See Drucker, supra note 69 (explaining that although Google’s money filters through 
its Irish subsidiary, the money still has another step in Google’s tax avoidance scheme); see 
supra note 55 (explaining the problem that arises with attributing the source of e-commerce, 
intellectual property, formulas, and designs). 
92 See I.R.C. § 482 (2006) (codifying the Arm’s Length Standard); see also supra note 80 
(explaining the meaning of the Arm’s Length Standard). 
93 Treas. Reg. § 1.482(b)(1) (1994); see REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 6–7 (2007) 
(maintaining that one is only engaged in the Arm’s Length Standard as long as he or she is 
looking for comparable prices); see also GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 407 (explaining that the 
Arm’s Length Standard requires that parties to a transaction not only calculate their 
respective profits separately, but also that related parties treat transactions as if unrelated 
parties had entered into them). 
94 See Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty:  The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance 
Tax Ruling, 29 VA. TAX REV. 137, 170 n.113 (2009) (explaining that the applicable standard in 
every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer). 
95 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length:  A Study in the Evolution of 
U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 137 (1995) (explaining that the Arm’s Length 
Standard leads to uncertainty because “neither the taxpayer nor the IRS can know in 
advance the likely revenue outcome in a transfer pricing case”); Wayne M. Gazur, An Arm’s 
Length Solution to the Shareholder Loan Tax Puzzle, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 407, 428–29 (2010) 
(establishing that an Arm’s Length Standard might be hard to prove in the majority of 
markets); see also Benshalom, supra note 76, at 621 (noting that another flaw in the Arm’s 
Length Standard is that it requires unrealistic levels of government monitoring and can be 
easily abused). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss1/8
2012] Closing International Loopholes 335 
Sandwich.”96  Google has created four separate subsidiaries and has used 
conflicting tax codes, as well as bilateral tax agreements to avoid paying 
almost any U.S. taxes.97  Google licenses to Google Ireland Holdings, a 
shell company with only two thousand employees, the offshore rights to 
its intellectual property for undisclosed fees so that the United States has 
an incentive to set a very low price.98  Next, while Google Ireland 
Holdings is an Irish company, it reports that its place of management 
(Irish residence rule) is centered in Bermuda, exempting it from Irish 
taxes.99  Google Ireland Holdings gets credit for about 88% of the 
company’s overseas sales, yet reported a pre-tax profit of less than 1% of 
sales in 2008, in large part because of the $5.4 billion in royalties it paid, 
indirectly, to the Bermuda managed company.100  Finally, the royalty 
payments from Google Ireland Holdings in Dublin take a quick detour to 
the Netherlands to avoid triggering an Irish withholding tax.101  In 
Amsterdam, Google Netherlands Holdings BV paid out 99.8% of the $5.4 
billion it received from Dublin to the unit managed in Bermuda.102  The 
Dutch company has no employees, meeting the definition of a shell 
corporation.103  Other corporations have now engaged in similar 
practices, which costs the United States billions of dollars in tax revenue 
annually.104  Now that this Note has described the tax avoidance 
problem, it will define a few popular proposals to fix this problem.105 
D. Popular Proposals 
The four most popular proposals to fix the corporate tax avoidance 
problem in the United States include:  (1) lowering the corporate tax rate, 
                                                 
96 See Sokatch, supra note 87, at 741 (explaining how this scheme received its name). 
97 See id. at 740 (explaining how Google developed its tax avoidance scheme). 
98 See id. at 740–42 (describing the first step of Google’s process); Drucker, supra note 69 
(explaining how Google uses the strategy of earnings stripping in the Netherlands). 
99 See Drucker, supra note 69 (explaining how Google manipulates the residence rules 
and filters their income through a complicated system of shell companies); see also supra 
Part II.B (providing a background for the U.S. corporate residence rules). 
100 See Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html 
(explaining how Google uses the transfer pricing method of tax avoidance). 
101 Id. (explaining the final step in Google’s tax avoidance scheme). 
102 Id. (describing Google’s use of Bermuda’s tax haven). 
103 See Sokatch, supra note 87, at 742 (evaluating the final numbers after Google has 
utilized several tax avoidance techniques.) 
104 See id. (explaining how other corporations are using the same type of techniques); see 
also supra note 7 (describing the widespread use of tax avoidance techniques by 
corporations all over the world). 
105 See infra Part II.D (defining a few popular proposals to fix the tax avoidance problem 
in the United States); infra Part IV (proposing a change to the tax base). 
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(2) shifting the U.S. tax system to a pure territorial tax, (3) continuing to 
add provisions to the Tax Code to address specific problems, and (4) 
using a formulary apportionment to tax corporations.106  Lowering the 
corporate rate refers to lowering the 35% corporate rate to a rate 
comparable to tax havens and other low-tax jurisdictions.107  This has 
become especially popular since President Obama made a proposal to 
lower the standard corporate tax rate from 35% to 28%.108  This plan 
focuses on attracting investment to the United States while reducing one 
of the highest tax rates in the world.109  Shifting to a pure territorial tax 
implies that the United States would no longer tax U.S. corporations on 
the basis of residency, taxing corporations based only on their U.S. 
source income.110  This is the way that most industrialized countries 
currently tax corporations.111  There has been much support for this 
                                                 
106  See infra text accompanying notes 106–18 (explaining generally these four proposals). 
107 See Kathryn J. Kennedy, The IRS’s Recent Uncertain Tax Positions Initiative:  A Tangle of 
Accounting, Tax and Privilege Issues, 9 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 401, 406 (2011) 
(acknowledging that lower tax rates could cause businesses to stay in the United States); 
Robert T. Kudrle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens:  Will it Last?  Will it 
Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 37, 41 (2003) (mentioning that firms invest in countries with 
low tax rates to give them a tax advantage); Richard T. Page, The International and 
Comparative Tax War:  A Strategic Tax Cut Recommendation for the Obama Administration, 18 
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 289–90 (2009) (listing other countries that have recently 
lowered their corporate tax); Meg Shreve, Sessions Open to Paying for Corporate Tax Cut, 130 
TAX NOTES 632, 632 (2011) (arguing for lowering the corporate tax rate in the United 
States); Martin Feldstein, Want to Boost the Economy?  Lower Corporate Tax Rates, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870358480457614413153907 
2472.html (explaining how lowering a country’s tax rate can attract investors).  But see 
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 
79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 21 (1993) (asserting that a corporate tax rate war would threaten the 
U.S. economy). 
108 See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama Proposes Lowering Corporate Tax Rate to 28 Percent, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-
to-propose-lowering-corporate-tax-rate-to-28-percent/2012/02/22/gIQA1sjdSR_story.html 
(explaining Obama’s proposal to cut the corporate tax to 28% in order to be competitive 
with other countries). 
109 Id. 
110 See David L. Cameron & Phillip F. Postlewaite, Incremental International Tax Reform:  A 
Review of Selected Proposals, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 565, 566–79 (2010) (describing a few 
proposals to fix the international tax avoidance problem in the United States); Michael S. 
Knoll, The Corporate Income Tax and the Competitiveness of U.S. Industries, 63 TAX L. REV. 771, 
772 (2010) (evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the United States moving to a 
territorial tax); Gravelle, supra note 49, at 491–92 (analyzing the territorial and worldwide 
tax systems).  But see Alex Khachaturian, Reforming the United States Export Tax Policy:  An 
Alternative to the American Trade War with the European Union, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 185, 195–97 (2008) (supporting the idea of a territorial tax in the United States). 
111 See GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 12–13 (explaining how most European nations have 
territorial systems and do not have a residence tax). 
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proposal because of its relative success in European countries.112  The 
third proposal—adding specific provisions to the Tax Code—is how the 
United States currently handles tax issues.113  When a problem arises, a 
provision is added to the Tax Code to retroactively address it.114  
Keeping the corporate tax system this way is the least popular of the 
current proposals because of its well documented failures in the past.115  
Formulary apportionment is a rather new proposal that suggests using a 
formula and basing a corporation’s income on a variety of factors.116  
This proposal is more modern in that it recognizes the abuse that results 
from corporations reporting their own income to the IRS.117  These 
proposals have advantages and disadvantages that can be best 
understood by first analyzing why these tax avoidance problems are 
occurring in the United States.118 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The IRS has struggled in its attempts to create regulations that 
prevent U.S. corporations from using tax avoidance techniques.119  Part 
III of this Note discusses the various reasons why the IRS has struggled 
to combat tax avoidance techniques and the continued effects that 
corporate tax avoidance is having on the U.S. economy as a whole.120  
More specifically, Part III.A explains the inherent problems contained 
within the current U.S. tax base, which make it difficult for the IRS to 
                                                 
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, § 681, 111th Cong. § 7492, Subchapter F (as 
introduced by Senator Levin, Mar. 2, 2009) (providing an example of retroactive rules 
proposed to the Tax Code); see also Gravelle, supra note 49, at 488–89 (explaining some 
specific provisions that could be added to the Tax Code); supra note 52 (discussing the 
complexity of tax code rules). 
114 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 23–26 (highlighting the complexities of the Tax Code, 
which explains why making tax laws after the fact do not work). 
115 See Bordoff & Furman, supra note 3, at 353–54 (illustrating the brokenness of the U.S. 
corporate tax system). 
116 See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 42, at 498 (advocating for the United States to switch 
its tax system to formulary apportionment); Morse, supra note 59, at 599–600 (examining 
the benefits of formulary apportionment).  But see Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of 
Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 149 (2011) (explaining formulary apportionment of 
income methodology as “the mechanism for allocating a multinational enterprise’s global 
income to source countries”). 
117 See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 42, at 498–99 (explaining some benefits of formulary 
apportionment). 
118 See infra Part III.A (analyzing why these loopholes in the U.S. Tax Code exist). 
119 See supra note 7 (noting how much revenue the United States is losing because of tax 
avoidance). 
120 See infra Part III (discussing various reasons why tax avoidance is a problem in U.S. 
tax law). 
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create regulations that effectively combat tax avoidance strategies.121  
Part III.B examines the continued negative effects that corporate tax 
avoidance has on the U.S. economy and some public policy reasons that 
support changing the Tax Code to better eliminate these tax loopholes.122  
Part III.C evaluates the shortcomings of some popular proposals that 
have been offered as solutions to the corporate tax avoidance problem.123  
Ultimately, Part III concludes that the existing regulations designed to 
address tax avoidance strategies fail to resolve this problem adequately 
because of the current structure of the U.S. tax base and that the best 
solution to this problem is to change the tax base altogether.124 
A. Inherent Problems with Current U.S. Tax Base 
“More effective taxation internationally is primarily a question of the 
tax base.”125  One inherent problem with the current tax base for 
corporations is that it promotes manipulation.126  One way it does this is 
exemplified in the fact that corporations separately report their income 
to the IRS.127  This means that corporations have the added incentive to 
report their income as low as possible, pay as little taxes as possible, and 
                                                 
121 See infra Part III.A (explaining the problems that the United States faces from using net 
income as the corporate tax base). 
122 See infra Part III.B (examining the negative effects that tax avoidance is having on the 
U.S. economy). 
123 See infra Part III.C (evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of some popular 
proposals to fix the tax avoidance problem). 
124 See infra Part IV (proposing to fix the corporate tax avoidance problem by changing 
the tax base). 
125 See Barker, supra note 29, at 651 (explaining generally the importance of having a good 
tax base); McCaffery & Hines, supra note 45, at 1041 (stating that the tax structure and rate 
depend on the tax base). 
126 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 10 (examining some of the shortcomings of the United 
States’ prescriptive corporate tax regime).  Holmes explains: 
[T]he U.S corporate tax system represents the worst of both worlds:  (i) 
a high statutory tax rate with relatively low, declining effective rates 
(and thus corporate tax revenue); and (ii) complex rules that fail to 
protect the corporate tax base, but can be manipulated, with significant 
social costs, by sophisticated MNCs to lower their effective rates. 
Id. 
127 See McIntyre et al., supra note 17, at 706–07 (explaining that separate reporting opens 
up the opportunity for corporations to employ tax minimization strategies).  The article 
explains transfer pricing and asserts that combined reporting “directly blocks these 
techniques and other similar tax-minimization strategies.”  Id.  See Mazerov, supra note 17, 
at 4 (“In combined-reporting states, however, corporate manipulation of transfer prices 
does not affect state corporate tax revenues.  Since the profits of a corporation’s 
components are added together to determine the corporation’s taxable base, the allocation 
of those profits within the corporation is irrelevant.”). 
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thus maximize their after tax profits.128  Because there is a lack of 
cooperation between countries on how high or low to set the tax rate for 
corporations, countries tend to undercut one another with lower tax 
rates so they can attract foreign investment.129  If corporations can 
manipulate their income so that it looks as though it was earned in a 
low-tax jurisdiction, then they can lower their tax liability.130  Former IRS 
Commissioner Mark Everson noted that large multinational corporations 
will “utilize every available resource to explore opportunities to reduce 
their tax liability by using the most intricate and complicated Code 
provisions . . . .”131  Corporations do not have an incentive to keep the 
income figure that they report to the IRS high, and the IRS cannot make 
laws forcing them to pay because of state sovereignty.132 
Since these rules were enacted, the U.S. economy has changed 
dramatically.133  Increases in technology have led to globalization, which 
has made it easier for capital and resources to be shifted 
internationally.134  The current tax base was created without this new 
                                                 
128 See McIntyre et al., supra note 17, at 708 (explaining that when income is separately 
reported, there is a higher likelihood of tax avoidance); see also Holmes, supra note 9, at 8 
(asserting that taxes tend to be a very critical part in a large corporation’s decision making 
processes because it is focused on maximizing its after-tax profits); Marcos, supra note 89, at 
22–23 (explaining the goals of efficient tax policies). 
129 See Rosenzweig, supra note 70, at 955 (explaining that tax havens exist because 
countries that cannot compete in a competitive market can attract investors by offering a 
minimal tax rate); Ring, supra note 5, at 184 (explaining that countries lower their tax rates 
to attract business); Addison, supra note 3, at 711 (“A state becomes a tax haven for one 
undeniable reason:  to attract capital to help promote growth in its financial industry.”). 
130 See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 30, at 400 (providing one method whereby corporations 
can shift the origin of their earned income); Kleinbard, supra note 45, at 735 (identifying 
cost sharing agreements as another popular way that corporations like to shift their 
profits). 
131 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’ Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Offshore Abuses:  The Enablers, the Tools and Offshore 
Secrecy, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Mark Everson, Comm’r, Internal Revenue), 
available at www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/stmt-8-1-06-everson-mark-irs.  See Weisbach, 
supra note 46, at 867 (explaining that nations assert tax sovereignty because they want to 
control revenue and fiscal policy); Kaplow, supra note 53, at 571–72 (explaining the 
complexity of tax rules compared to that of tax standards). 
132 See Ring, supra note 5, at 160, 170 (explaining that countries are the supreme source of 
control over their respective tax laws); supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining 
that the United States cannot enforce a tax regulation on a foreign corporation that derived 
its income outside of the United States). 
133 See Bordoff & Furman, supra note 3, at 341 (“The U.S. economy has become 
increasingly integrated with the rest of the world over the past twenty years, due to 
advances in technology and transportation.  The result has been greater flows across 
borders of goods, services, capital, people, and ideas.”).  
134 See Benshalom, supra note 5, at 166 (noting the change in the corporate structure due 
to globalization); Holmes, supra note 9, at 7 (“Globalization has both magnified the 
competitive pressures that MNCs feel from their foreign competitors and increased the 
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technology in mind, and the United States cannot easily account for this 
change because the problem extends internationally.135  The IRS is not 
able to hold these corporations liable for their tax avoidance, because 
their behavior is completely legal in the United States.136 
Another problem with the current tax base is that it was enacted, for 
the most part, in 1962 and 1986.137  As technology and the U.S. economy 
changed, the IRS addressed the changing needs of the corporate tax 
system by adding patchwork rules to the framework, instead of 
reviewing and reformulating the tax base as a whole.138  This created a 
very complex set of rules to compensate for the outdated tax base.139  
Corporations have found ways around most of these rules, because the 
rules lack coherence and uniformity, often working to counteract each 
other.140 
                                                                                                             
ability of jurisdictions around the world to effectively compete for their resources.”).  See 
generally Birdsall, supra note 5 (describing the globalization of the last few decades). 
135 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 3, at 1575–76 (discussing how the increased mobility of 
capital due to technological advances has led to international tax competition, because 
companies can easily shift capital to low-tax jurisdictions). 
136 See Tillinghast, supra note 5, at 38–39 (explaining how the IRS has certain powers in 
enforcing tax laws within the United States that it lacks in other jurisdictions).  The IRS 
does not have a practical way to enforce U.S. tax liabilities on foreign corporations.  Id.  See 
also supra note 5 (explaining the limits on the U.S. taxing authority). 
137 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 1009 (codified as amended at 
26 U.S.C. § 954 (2006)).  The most significant changes to the international tax system since 
the 1960s occurred in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which adopted changes to the income 
source, expense allocation, and foreign tax credit rules; however, these changes did not 
alter the fundamental system.  See generally Peter H. Blessing et al., Report of the Task Force 
on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649 (2006). 
138 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 11–12 (summarizing the American Bar Association’s 
findings regarding the U.S. tax system).  Holmes provides the following conclusions: 
As a result, the United States has gone “from a complex to a super-
complex regime . . . .”  Indeed, the American Bar Association, in its 
recent report evaluating various tax reform proposals, recognized that 
the “accretion of tax rules without periodic thorough reviews of the 
needs of the system” is a key source of complexity in the corporate tax 
regime. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  The enormous complexity of the tax system creates efficiency, 
administrative, and equity problems.  Id.  This includes the increased compliance costs to 
taxpayers, challenging administrative enforcement, and proliferation of high cost tax 
planning.  Id.  See also note 46 (noting the complexity of the U.S. Tax Code). 
139 See Barker, supra note 29, at 649–50 (noting that Congress adds patches to the existing 
system to close loopholes and raise additional revenue); see also Holmes, supra note 9, at 11 
(recommending a fundamental review of the outdated tax system); Weisbach, supra note 
46, at 882 (explaining the downfalls of putting rules on top of rules); supra note 46 
(explaining the intricacies and complexities of U.S. tax laws). 
140 See Barton, supra note 8, at 1050 (“The IRS attempts to close the loopholes that allow 
MNCs to avoid paying taxes on money that the U.S. Treasury should be entitled to tax.  Yet 
these practices have essentially created a game of cat and mouse, and companies always 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 [2012], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss1/8
2012] Closing International Loopholes 341 
B. Negative Effects 
These tax avoidance strategies are continuing to have negative 
effects on the U.S. economy by unfairly draining significant tax revenue 
away from the U.S. government.141  This is harmful because the U.S. 
government then has to raise revenue in other ways (like raising taxes on 
individuals) to make up for the large U.S. deficit, instead of using these 
corporate funds.142  The first function of taxation is to raise revenue to 
pay for the benefits associated with being a U.S. citizen or business.143  If 
the larger corporations are not paying their corporate income tax, then 
they are, in effect, passing these costs onto someone else while still 
utilizing the same U.S. economy, infrastructure, and other benefits that 
the United States provides.144 
Another negative effect that these tax avoidance strategies have on 
the United States is the long-term loss of jobs and capital to other 
countries.145  U.S. corporations that employ these tax avoidance 
strategies end up attributing most of their money to these low-tax 
jurisdictions in order to pay less.146  The money is not taxed until it is 
brought back, or repatriated, to the United States.147  This creates the fear 
that the United States will permanently lose jobs, assets, and production 
                                                                                                             
seem one step ahead of the government.”); see also Lynch, supra note 15 (explaining that big 
corporations will always try to find ways to save money on taxes). 
141 See Hirsch, supra note 2 (explaining that U.S. multinational corporations are 
collectively avoiding anywhere between $10 billion and $60 billion a year in taxes by 
shifting their earnings on paper to overseas subsidiaries); Bill McGuire, U.S. Debt Tops $15 
Trillion Mark Today, ABC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
business/2011/11/u-s-debt-will-top-15-trillion-mark-today/ (noting the record breaking 
debt in the United States);  see also Tansill, supra note 7, at 294 (describing how President 
Obama’s administration planned to make laws stopping tax avoidance techniques so that 
money could be put towards the U.S. deficit). 
142 See Sokatch, supra note 87, at 747 (explaining that the United States will try to find 
ways to stop tax avoidance so it can pay for its historically high national deficit); Shah, 
supra note 7 (explaining that most governments tax the population to compensate for the 
lost revenue from corporate tax avoidance). 
143 See sources cited supra note 32 (providing a variety of sources that explain the benefits 
theory of taxation). 
144 See Hirsch, supra note 2 (providing a study of the largest U.S. corporations); see also 
Shah, supra note 7 (explaining that individual taxes are raised as a result of corporate tax 
avoidance). 
145 See Press Release, supra note 4 (explaining how the United States has lost jobs to 
foreign countries because these countries offer tax incentives, encouraging corporations to 
move their operations overseas); Rosenzweig, supra note 70, at 956 (describing how low-tax 
jurisdictions attract investment). 
146 See supra Part II.C (stating that the goal of avoidance techniques is to make the IRS 
attribute earnings to a country with lower taxes). 
147 See supra notes 42, 44–45, 50 (analyzing tax deferral and explaining that corporations 
are not taxed until they repatriate the money back into the United States). 
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to foreign jurisdictions, because it is much cheaper for corporations to 
operate abroad.148  On the other hand, the United States arguably has the 
most attractive market when it comes to investment and, no matter how 
cheap investment is in other jurisdictions, corporations will still invest in 
the United States because of the how much it imports.149 
The policy arguments heavily favor the need to change the corporate 
tax system to account for these tax avoidance strategies.150  The United 
States never intended for these corporations to avoid paying corporate 
income tax.151  According to the benefit theory of taxation and other 
equity theories, these corporations should be required to pay their 
corporate taxes even if they have the resources to find loopholes in the 
system.152  The question is not whether it should be done, but rather 
what is the most effective way to remedy the problem.153  Next, this Note 
analyzes some common proposals to fix this problem before ultimately 
concluding that, instead of adding another regulation to the current 
complex Tax Code, the United States should change its tax base 
altogether.154 
C. Popular Proposals 
As the tax avoidance problem has persisted, the public has opposed 
the corporate use of tax avoidance techniques and supported corporate 
                                                 
148 See Hufbauer & Kim, supra note 60, at 2 n.6 (discussing the United States’ downward 
trend in the world economy and how the United States is losing its competitive advantage 
against the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Korea). 
149 See The World’s Largest Economies, supra note 14 (identifying the top economies in the 
world).  The U.S. is the largest economy in the world, thus the largest consumer of goods 
and services in the world.  Id. 
150 See Gravelle, supra note 22, at 89–90 (explaining some policy arguments for the need 
for corporate tax reform in the United States).  See generally JOINT REP. WHITE HOUSE & 
DEP’T TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-
Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf (explaining the push towards closing 
loopholes, broadening the tax base, and cutting corporate tax rates). 
151 See GRAVELLE, supra note 2, at 13 (explaining the definition of tax avoidance).  There 
are a variety of factors that give corporations the ability to avoid taxes, none of which are 
because the United States wanted it.  See generally Part II (explaining the background of the 
U.S. tax structure and how tax avoidance came to be). 
152 See supra note 32 (describing the benefit theory of taxation); see also Holmes, supra note 
9, at 13 (explaining that when corporations spend dollars on tax planning it creates an 
extraordinary amount of social waste and can result in lower profits, higher prices for 
goods and services for customers, and decreased capital available for domestic and foreign 
investment). 
153 See THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM, supra note 150, at 1 
(noting that America’s system of business taxation is in need of reform). 
154 See infra Part III.C (examining the disadvantages of some popular proposals to fix the 
tax avoidance problem). 
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tax reform.155  Part III.C.1 evaluates what would happen if the United 
States tried lowering its tax rate; Part III.C.2 examines the possibility of 
shifting to a territorial tax; Part III.C.3 looks at the option of continuing 
with the same strategy; and Part III.C.4 assesses the option of formulary 
apportionment.156 
1. Lowering the Corporate Tax Rate 
One common proposal is for the United States to lower its corporate 
tax rate to be more competitive with other countries.157  In theory, this 
would solve the tax avoidance problem because if the United States 
lowers the rate, there will no longer be an incentive for corporations to 
shift their income abroad.158  Some positives of this approach are that it 
would attract more foreign investment and keep domestic corporations 
from shifting their earnings abroad.159  The major reason why this would 
not work is that corporations are greedy and even if the United States 
lowers its corporate rate, there will always be lower tax jurisdictions to 
which corporations will try to shift their earnings.160  For example, if 
President Obama’s proposal to cut corporate tax rates to 28% passes, 
corporations, such as Google, that use tax avoidance strategies to cut 
their effective tax rate to around 3% will still be saving a substantial 
amount of money by using these strategies.161  The fact that the rate is 
lower will not matter because another country will probably have a 
lower rate.162 
2. Shifting to a Pure Territorial Tax 
Another common proposal is to stop taxing corporations based on 
incorporation and only tax them based on where income is earned, like 
                                                 
155 See Faulhaber, supra note 7, at 178–79 (explaining that public opposition grew on a 
global scale as the issue of tax avoidance become more well-known). 
156 See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the possibility of lowering the tax rate); infra Part 
III.C.2 (describing the territorial tax); infra Part III.C.3 (listing specific provisions of the 
current Tax Code); infra Part III.C.4 (evaluating formulary apportionment). 
157 See Kennedy, supra note 107, at 406 (discussing lowering the corporate tax rate as a 
means of competing with low-tax jurisdictions). 
158 Id.; see also supra Part II.C (explaining four popular tax avoidance techniques and 
noting that the goal is for corporations to filter their money into a country with a lower tax 
rate). 
159 See supra note 107 (describing how countries with lower tax rates attract investment 
because it costs less to do business there). 
160 See Lynch, supra note 15 (explaining that no matter how low the tax rate is, 
corporations will try to find new ways around them). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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most other developed countries.163  There would no longer be a foreign 
tax credit, which would lead to a more efficient and a more simplified 
system.164  This approach would also ensure that the United States 
remains an attractive location for multinational corporation 
headquarters.165  This proposal is likely to fail, because it would still 
incentivize corporations to manipulate their income.166  Corporations 
could continue to transfer income into jurisdictions with a lower source 
tax rate; thus, unless the United States had the lowest tax rate in the 
world, there would still be the incentive to shift income.167  Although this 
approach would simplify the tax system, the same worries about income 
manipulation would exist as they do now.168 
3. Specific Provisions to Address Tax Avoidance 
Another popular proposal is to keep the U.S. tax system as is and 
continue adding provisions to the Tax Code when specific problems 
                                                 
163 See Rosenzweig, supra note 70, at 964–66 (explaining how a country would go about 
imposing a territorial tax); see also Barker, supra note 29, at 715 (advocating a territorial 
approach to corporate taxation); Gravelle, supra note 49, at 491 (offering analyses of these 
proposals and indicating that switching to a territorial tax would raise tax revenues in the 
United States by $10 billion); Kleinbard, supra note 45, at 701 (noting that there is pressure 
on the United States to change to a territorial tax system); Shaviro, supra note 39, at 378 
(explaining that all of the other world industrial powers use a territorial tax system).  See 
generally supra Part II (explaining the territorial tax system). 
164 See Brown, supra note 56, at 589–90 (explaining that countries using a foreign tax credit 
give primary taxing authority to the source country); see also Fleming, Jr. et al., supra note 
48, at 82 (discussing the complexity and heavy administrative costs of the foreign tax credit 
system); supra Part II (laying out the basics of the territorial tax system). 
165 See Knoll, supra note 110, at 782–83 (noting that if the United States adopted a 
territorial tax, it would remove the unduly tax burden of being a U.S. corporation and 
attract more investors); Rosenzweig, supra note 70, at 965 (explaining that a territorial tax 
leads to tax competition among countries); Shaviro, supra note 39, at 378 (asserting that as 
long as the territorial tax rate is comparable to other industrialized countries, corporations 
will not shy away from investing in the United States). 
166 See Rosenzweig, supra note 70, at 965 (noting that manipulation can still occur under a 
pure territorial tax system). 
167 Gravelle, supra note 49, at 492.  Outlining several criticisms with the territorial tax, the 
author explains: 
The main reservation with an explicit territorial approach is that it 
increases the pressure to shift profits into active business enterprises in 
low-tax jurisdictions. The increased pressures on transfer pricing, 
including shifting of intangibles and the income from those intangibles 
into low-tax jurisdictions, were cited by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation and others as a problem with a territorial approach. 
Id. 
168 Id. 
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arise.169  These new provisions would be narrow and technical, 
addressing very specific problems and attempting to cut down tax 
avoidance strategies.170  An example of this might be an alteration that 
changes the Arms Length Standard or cracks down on specific tax 
havens.171  Provisions like this are beneficial because they are goal 
oriented and are not as difficult to implement, as they are only minor 
changes.172  The reason why these types of regulations have failed is that 
they add more complexity to the Tax Code and do not act with 
uniformity.  Regulations like this are also known to address certain 
problems with the effect of creating new problems.173  Since the main 
formulation of the Tax Code, all the changes have been small regulations 
that build on one another.174 
4. Formulary Apportionment 
Under formulary apportionment, a corporation’s worldwide income 
is calculated using a mathematical formula that reflects the distribution 
of economic activity and divides the income of the business among the 
jurisdictions in which it operates.175  The formula treats a parent and a 
subsidiary as the same unit and uses factors such as sales, assets, or 
payroll to determine the tax rate in a certain jurisdiction.176  Essentially, a 
                                                 
169 See id. at 487–88 (providing some examples of provisions that could be added to the 
Tax Code). 
170 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 20–21 (describing the current prescriptive rules that the 
United States has in its Tax Code); Kaplow, supra note 53, at 588–89 (assessing the 
complexity of U.S. Tax Code while analyzing the alternatives to tax standards). 
171 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (2006) (defining and codifying the Arm’s Length Standard); see 
also Lipin, supra note 74, at 665–67 (explaining that there are thousands of pages in the Tax 
Code that have been changed numerous times). 
172 See Barker, supra note 29, at 649–50 (explaining how the government sometimes adds 
patchwork rules). 
173 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 12–13 (explaining that the enormous complexity of the tax 
system creates inefficiency, as well as  administrative and equity problems).  This includes 
the increased compliance costs to taxpayers, challenges to administrative enforcement, and 
proliferation of high cost tax planning.  Id. 
174 See Lipin, supra note 74, at 666–67 (explaining how each rule adds to the depth and 
makes matters worse instead of better). 
175 See Morse, supra note 59, at 601–02 (providing a general explanation of formulary 
apportionment). 
 Under formulary apportionment, the existence of an 
apportionment factor such as sales into the jurisdiction—rather than 
residence or source—could constitute taxing nexus.  Accordingly, 
formulary apportionment would have no need for the current rules 
determining corporate residence or corporate income source.  It is a 
wholly different way of allocating jurisdiction to tax. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
176 Id. at 600. 
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corporation would only pay U.S. taxes on the share of worldwide income 
that was apportioned to the United States using the formula.177  A major 
strength of formulary apportionment is that it would eliminate most of a 
corporation’s incentive to shift its earnings into a low-tax jurisdiction, 
because it would base a corporation’s tax liability on measures of its real 
economic activity as established by the formula, rather than its legal 
residence or form.178  Another strength of this system is that it simplifies 
the tax system for corporations into one formula.179  However, formulary 
apportionment is likely to fail, because it would require the cooperation 
of foreign countries in order to properly implement the system.180  This 
would be extremely difficult as most countries have existing tax treaties 
or are trying to attract investment by offering a lower tax rate.181  
Although there are some strengths associated with the common 
proposals, none of them adequately address the corporate tax avoidance 
problem.  Thus, this Note proposes to fix the problem by changing the 
U.S. corporate tax base to either (1) revenue reported to a U.S. public 
stock exchange or (2) revenue reported to a U.S bank to obtain a loan.182 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The current tax base allows many corporations to use international 
loopholes to take advantage of the U.S. tax system, costing the United 
States billions annually in lost tax revenue.183  Society’s ever increasing 
obsession with maximizing profits has encouraged corporations to cheat 
the United States out of tax revenue, even though the United States has 
provided these corporations with many resources that contribute to their 
                                                 
177 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 42, at 498 (proposing a particular formulary 
apportionment in which the fraction of that corporation’s worldwide income would be “the 
sum of (1) a fixed return on their expenses in the United States and (2) the share of their 
worldwide sales that occur in the United States”). 
178 See id. at 510–16 (examining the advantages and disadvantages of formulary 
apportionment).  Formulary apportionment removes the incentive for companies to use 
accounting devices to shift income on paper because it does not matter where the income is 
attributed.  Id.  The formula takes a percentage of the corporation’s worldwide income.  Id. 
179 Id. 
180 See Kleinbard, supra note 116, at 150–51 (explaining that formulary apportionment can 
bring about its own harm).  There would still be an incentive for smaller countries to 
remain as tax havens and not cooperate.  Id.  Unless cooperation is full among the 
international community, corporations will just flee to the countries that are not 
participating and that still have very little or no corporate tax.  Id. 
181 Id. 
182 See infra Part IV (proposing a change to the tax base as a solution to the corporate tax 
avoidance problem). 
183 See supra Part II.B (explaining the current U.S. tax structure); supra Part II.C 
(examining some popular tax avoidance techniques that corporations use). 
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success.184  The current outdated tax structure has proved that it is 
impossible to reconcile this tax problem by making new laws that fit into 
the structure.185  Every new law opens up another loophole in the system 
and makes it more complicated.186  However, tax avoidance creates such 
great harm to the economy that something must be done to capture this 
tax revenue.187  Unlike all other unsuccessful attempts, this proposal 
attempts to fix the problem by changing the initial tax base, instead of 
merely adding another law to an already complicated tax structure.188 
First, Part IV.A proposes a new tax base in statutory form and 
explains why it is a superior method of taxing corporations.189  More 
specifically, Part IV.A.1 explains the first part of the new tax base—
taxing corporations on revenue reported to a U.S. public stock 
exchange.190  Then, Part IV.A.2 examines the second part of the new tax 
base—taxing corporations on revenue reported to a U.S. bank to obtain a 
loan.191  Lastly, Part IV.B examines the potential problems associated 
with such a big change in the tax structure.192 
A. Proposed Tax Base 
To address tax avoidance strategies, the tax base for publicly traded 
corporations and corporations that apply for a bank loan should be 
changed to revenue.  Accordingly, a corporation would be taxed on its 
revenue if that corporation (1) is traded publicly on a U.S. public stock 
exchange, or (2) applies for a loan from a U.S. bank.  If a corporation 
does not do either of these things, then its tax base will not change, and it 
will continue to pay tax on its net income reported to the IRS.  The 
proposed amendment appears as follows: 
                                                 
184 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining the theory that corporations 
should pay taxes if they take advantage of the benefits a country provides). 
185 See supra Part III.A (discussing the problems with the current tax base, which make it 
difficult for the United States to prevent tax avoidance); see also supra notes 3, 7 (discussing 
the prevalence of corporations using tax avoidance methods). 
186 See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text (explaining how the complexity and 
lack of uniformity of the Tax Code leads to loopholes, which corporations are able to 
exploit). 
187 See supra Part III.B (discussing the continued negative effects that tax avoidance is 
having on the U.S. economy). 
188 See supra Part II.B (identifying and explaining some of the failed reform measures); see 
also Part III.C (examining some popular proposals to fix the U.S. tax avoidance problem). 
189 See infra IV.A (proposing an amended tax base that decreases incentives for 
corporations to manipulate financial records). 
190 See infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining how a corporation would be taxed on a percentage of 
its total revenue reported to a U.S. public stock exchange). 
191 See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how a corporation would be taxed on a percentage of 
its total revenue reported to a U.S. bank). 
192 See infra Part IV.B (noting the potential problems in implementing this new tax base). 
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Proposed Amendment to I.R.C. § 11(a)(1)(2)193 
(a) Corporations in General—A tax is hereby imposed for each 
taxable year on the total revenue of a corporation—U.S. resident or 
not—if: 
(1) The corporation is publicly traded on a U.S. public stock exchange; 
or 
(2) The corporation applied for a bank loan from a U.S. bank. 
(b) If a corporation does not fall into § 11(a)(1) or § 11(a)(2), then a tax is 
hereby imposed on the taxable income reported by that corporation to 
the IRS. 
(c) If a corporation operates at a loss, then it will not be subject to any tax 
on its revenue. 
(d) Revenue will be determined by: 
(1) The total revenue the corporation reports to the public stock 
exchange in § 11(a)(1) on its Form 10-k or equivalent reporting 
procedure; or 
(2) By the total revenue the corporation reports to the U.S. bank in 
§ 11(a)(2). 
(3) If a corporation falls into both § 11(a)(1) and § 11(a)(2), the 
revenue figure used will be the higher of the two reported. 
(e) Definitions 
(1) U.S. public stock exchange—any stock exchange registered as a 
U.S public exchange with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  This includes but is not limited to:  Arizona Stock 
Exchange (AZX), BATS Exchange, Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE), Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME), Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX), 
Direct Edge, International Securities Exchange (ISE), NASDAQ 
Stock Market, National Stock Exchange (NSE), and the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
(2) U.S. bank—any bank registered under the laws of the United 
States. 
Commentary 
The above provisions change the corporate tax base for publicly 
traded corporations and corporations that apply for a bank loan from 
income reported to the IRS to total revenue reported to a U.S. public 
stock exchange or U.S. bank.  If a corporation is not traded on a U.S. 
                                                 
193 The proposals are the contribution of the author.  Specifically, proposed additions are 
italicized while the unitalicized portions are taken from I.R.C. § 11(a)–(b).  See generally 
I.R.C. § 11(a)–(b) (2006). 
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public stock exchange and it does not obtain a loan from a U.S. bank, 
then its tax base does not change, and it is taxed the same way that 
corporations are currently taxed.  This means that the tax base for small, 
private corporations will not change, and the tax base for corporations 
who apply for loans through foreign banks will also remain the same.  
The two main reasons why this proposal does not focus on private 
corporations are (1) because the majority of the U.S. corporate tax 
revenue comes from publicly traded corporations, and (2) because most 
private corporations do not have the resources to shift their income into 
countries with lower tax rates.  This proposal does not change the tax 
base for corporations that apply for loans through foreign banks because 
that information would not be easily obtained. 
To continue, this proposal treats corporations that operate at a loss as 
they are currently treated—not making them pay any taxes, because 
corporations should not have to pay taxes on what they do not have.  
This proposal also does not deal with any other specific provisions—
such as the exact rate that corporations would be taxed—just the initial 
corporate tax base.  Addressing these specific provisions in a tax code 
that is over 70,000 pages long would be overly complicated and 
ultimately outside the scope of this Note, especially since it is evident 
that changing the tax base in this manner would greatly reduce 
corporate tax avoidance and significantly increase U.S. tax revenue.  
Most corporate tax rules, like the foreign tax credit system, are focused 
on fairly taxing corporations while at the same time keeping businesses 
from moving abroad.  However, corporations have found ways to 
manipulate these rules to their benefit to pay a lesser tax rate.  Since this 
was not the original purpose or design of most U.S. international tax 
laws, the tax base should be changed to account for the fact that certain 
laws, like the foreign tax credit, might be subject to manipulation.  
Making the tax base a higher revenue figure will help ensure that the 
total tax revenue does not decrease.  Part IV.A.1 examines the first part 
of the proposed statute and Part IV.A.2 analyzes the second part.194 
1. Revenue Reported to a U.S. Stock Exchange 
This section of the proposed tax suggests that corporations be taxed 
if they are publicly traded on a U.S. stock exchange.  Corporations are 
taxed on revenue previously reported to a stock exchange on their Form 
                                                 
194 See infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining why taxing total revenue reported to a public stock 
exchange is a good alternative tax base); infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing why taxing total 
revenue reported to banks is superior to taxing income). 
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10-k.195  The Form 10-k is an annual report that each publicly traded 
corporation must file with the SEC giving a comprehensive summary of 
the corporation’s performance.  This ensures that the tax base is not a 
separately reported figure to the IRS and takes away corporations’ 
incentive to report the lowest possible figure so that their taxes are 
lower.196  Additionally, there is no longer an incentive for a corporation 
to manipulate financial records for tax purposes because there is already 
the motivation to keep the figure as high as possible.197  When a 
corporation is traded on a U.S. public stock exchange, like NASDAQ, 
NYSE, or AMEX, the corporation’s main goal is to maximize shareholder 
value by either increasing the stock price or paying out dividends to 
shareholders.198  The best way to maximize shareholder value is by 
attracting investors so that the stock price of that company will 
increase.199  One of the main components of determining shareholder 
value is the corporation’s total revenue.200  Therefore, a corporation will 
want to report a high revenue figure so that it can increase its 
shareholder value and thus attract investors.   
Although the ultimate goal of a corporation is to maximize income, a 
corporation’s revenue is often a good determinate of its growth.  Taxing 
corporations on their reported revenue is also more effective than taxing 
corporations on their reported income because net income can be 
distorted by manipulating expenses, interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization, all of which are subtracted from revenue.  Also, as 
mentioned above, using a higher tax base figure, such as revenue, takes 
into account the fact that there are some U.S. tax laws, like the foreign tax 
credit system, that will always be subject to manipulation.  Therefore, by 
using revenue, the tax base will be larger, a more true representation of a 
corporation’s tax liability, and immune from manipulation.  The United 
States does not need any extra cooperation with other nations to impose 
this tax base because the reported revenue comes straight from the U.S. 
stock exchange.201  Also, this provision is easily applied to U.S. public 
                                                 
195 See supra Part II.C (noting the dilemma created when companies must report their tax 
base separately, as illustrated by Google). 
196 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of combined 
reporting). 
197 See supra Part II.C (describing some popular tax avoidance techniques and notiing 
how corporations have an incentive to manipulate financial records in all of them). 
198 See supra note 89 (explaining how the main goal of corporations is to maximize profit). 
199 See Lee, supra note 89, at 36–37 (explaining how stock price is a direct reflection of 
shareholder value). 
200 Id. at 35. 
201 See supra Part III.C.4 (determining that formulary apportionment would be too 
difficult to implement because it would call for a great deal of international cooperation 
between countries). 
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stock exchanges and does not contain any intricate provisions that could 
open up loopholes.202 
2. Revenue Reported to a U.S. Bank 
In the second section of the proposed tax base, a corporation is taxed 
when it applies for a loan at a U.S. bank.  When a corporation applies for 
a loan with a bank, it presents financial data to the bank so that it can 
evaluate the merits of the corporation’s ability to pay the loan back.203  
Like in the first section, this takes away the separate reporting aspect 
because the total revenue number comes from the bank.204  This also 
eliminates the incentive to manipulate records and lower total revenue, 
because one of the main components that banks look at when evaluating 
corporate loans is revenue.  The higher the revenue figure, the more 
likely the corporation will be able to pay back the loan, and thus the 
higher loan amount that the corporation can obtain.  Inherent, then, is 
the notion that a corporation will not distort this revenue amount but 
will keep it as high as possible so it is able to secure a larger loan.  In 
addition, there would not be any international cooperation needed—
only cooperation with U.S. banks—and the concept is fairly 
straightforward with a limited set of rules.205 
Instead of merely adding another law to an already complicated tax 
structure that combats tax avoidance and attempts to reconcile an 
outdated tax base, the proposed solution updates the tax base to 
eliminate the incentive for corporations to manipulate financial 
figures.206  Of course, as with any change to the tax structure of this 
magnitude, there are potential problems that must be analyzed.207 
                                                 
202 See supra note 46 (detailing the complexity of the tax and how every new intricacy 
opens up another loophole); see also supra Part III.C.4 (explaining the difficulty in 
implementing a tax structure like formulary apportionment). 
203 See Wilmarth, supra note 64, at 230–31 (listing the requirements for obtaining a loan 
since 1975). 
204 See supra note 127 (asserting that manipulation becomes an issue when things are 
separately reported); supra note 17 (describing how combined reporting eliminates the 
incentive to manipulate). 
205 See supra Part III.C.4 (noting how international cooperation is not an easy thing in this 
economy); see also supra note 47 (explaining how complexity negatively affects the Tax 
Code). 
206 See supra Part III.A (explaining that one of the problems with the tax base is that it 
does not account for the changes in technology and the global economy). 
207 See infra Part IV.B (analyzing the possible problems that could occur when 
implementing this new tax base). 
VanDenburgh: Closing International Loopholes:  Changing the Corporate Tax Base
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
352 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
B. Potential Problems 
Since changing the tax base would be a complete revamp of the 
current tax structure, there are possible problems that could arise.208  
First, because the proposed tax base is calculated from a corporation’s 
total revenue, there are potential issues in determining an applicable rate 
because not all of the money was earned in the United States.209  Most 
likely, the rate would have to take into account the fact that not all of the 
revenue was produced in the United States and would have to be much 
lower than the current tax rate of 35%.  Second, there could be issues 
with double taxation.210  The rate would have to be low enough to 
account for the fact that corporations might be taxed in other countries 
on the same revenue.211   
Third, this type of tax could cause corporations to invest in public 
stock exchanges overseas or obtain loans overseas, causing the United 
States to lose businesses and jobs permanently.212  Considering the size 
and dominance of the U.S. stock exchanges, this would probably not be a 
smart option for many of the larger corporations that are currently using 
tax avoidance strategies.  The advantages of being a member of a U.S. 
stock exchange, being able to obtain loans from U.S. banks, and being in 
the U.S. market are so great that most corporations would not be willing 
to pass up the U.S. market permanently.   
Fourth, there could be execution problems if the U.S. banks or stock 
exchanges are not able to report this information efficiently.213  However, 
the proposed process should be simple enough to avoid significant 
barriers.  Last, because corporations will continue to avoid taxation if 
they operate at a loss, there could be a potential issue with corporations 
manipulating their financial statements to show a loss.  This problem 
could easily be solved by additional legislation monitoring whether a 
corporation reported income on their Form 10-k.  Although these 
potential problems exist, the advantages of having a tax base that 
                                                 
208 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing how there have been only two major 
structural changes in the U.S. Tax Code); see also supra Part II.A (explaining how the 
fundamental tax structure from the 1920’s remains today). 
209 See supra Part II.B (comparing territorial taxation and worldwide taxation); see also 
supra note 113 (asserting that some countries base their rate on competitiveness 
internationally). 
210 See supra note 27 (exploring the issue of double taxation). 
211 See supra Part II.A (noting the benefits theory of taxation).  Following this theory, if 
income is earned in more than one country, then both countries have the right to tax.  Id. 
212 See supra note 107 (asserting that countries lower their rates so that they can attract 
investment). 
213 See supra Part III.C (examining the implementation problems contained within these 
four popular proposals). 
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eliminates the incentive for tax avoidance greatly outweighs these 
potential problems. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The United States, along with most industrialized nations, follows 
the benefit theory of taxation.214  As a result, the United States enforces a 
tax because of the benefits that corporations receive from the U.S. market 
and economy.215  Since the establishment of the corporate tax, 
corporations have been taxed on the basis of the income that they 
reported separately to the IRS.216  The income is then subjected to many 
rules, regulations, and provisions designed to ensure that companies are 
paying their share of taxes.217  For example, there are laws establishing 
that a corporation owes tax if it earns the income in the United States, or 
if it is a U.S. resident corporation.218   
As the global economy has progressed over time, it has become 
much easier for corporations to circumvent the rules and manipulate the 
income they report through financial records.219  This allows 
corporations to escape tax liability by reporting that income was earned 
in other countries with lower tax rates.220  It is difficult for the United 
States to enforce its tax laws because of national sovereignty.221  Today, 
large corporations, such as Google, employ a wide variety of tax 
avoidance techniques to avoid billions in taxes annually.222 
Most proposals to fix the U.S tax avoidance problem contain new 
regulations, which are designed to ensure that companies pay a fair 
amount of taxes.223  However, every time a new law is passed to fix a 
part of the Tax Code, corporations discover new loopholes.  This has 
resulted in a very complicated U.S. Tax Code that does not effectively 
combat the tax avoidance problem.224 
                                                 
214 See supra Part II.A (detailing the history of the U.S. corporate tax). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 See supra Part II.B (explaining the basic U.S. tax structure); supra note 47 (noting the 
complexity of the U.S. Tax Code). 
218 See supra Part II.B (discussing the basic tax framework and establishing when the 
United States has tax jurisdiction). 
219 See supra Part II.C (exploring a few major tax avoidance techniques that corporations 
use to bypass tax law). 
220 Id. 
221 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining why sovereignty prevents the 
United States from enforcing its tax laws in other countries). 
222 See supra Part II.C.4 (outlining the entire tax avoidance process that Google uses). 
223 See supra Part III.C (analyzing some of the popular proposals to fix the tax avoidance 
problem). 
224 See supra note 46 (explaining the intricacies of the U.S. Tax Code). 
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This Note’s proposed solution is to change the U.S. tax base, 
imposing taxes on a corporation if it (1) is traded publicly on a U.S. 
public stock exchange or (2) applies for a loan from a U.S. bank.225  The 
new tax base would tax a corporation’s total income as reported to either 
the stock exchange or bank.  Altering the tax base in this way would 
eliminate the incentive for corporations to manipulate their financial 
records.226  The corporate tax would be based on something that has 
already been reported and that corporations have an incentive to keep 
high.227  Corporations have an incentive to keep their revenue figure 
high when reporting to the public stock exchange so that they maximize 
shareholder wealth.  Likewise, they have the incentive to keep their 
revenue figure high when obtaining a bank loan so that they can obtain a 
larger loan.  The proposed tax base is also beneficial because it lacks 
complexity, requires very minimal international cooperation, and is 
fairly easy to implement. 
However, with any tax structure change of this magnitude, there 
might be problems in the execution.228  Nevertheless, the advantages of 
the new tax base greatly outweigh any potential problems.  The change 
will reduce tax avoidance, increase tax revenue, and eliminate many 
harmful effects that tax avoidance is having on the United States.  
Therefore, enacting this proposed solution would not only restore equity 
back to the corporate tax but also give rise to a much more stable 
economy. 
Using this new tax base would change the situation for NoTax.  
Instead of owing taxes on its relatively small net income reported to the 
IRS, NoTax would owe tax on the three hundred and fifty million dollars 
of worldwide revenue.  The fact that NoTax reduced its reported net 
income to the IRS by thirty-three million dollars is irrelevant because 
NoTax would pay corporate tax as a percentage of its worldwide 
income.  Since NoTax reported around the same worldwide revenue to 
                                                 
225 See supra Part IV (proposing a change in the tax base to combat the tax avoidance 
problem in the United States). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the possible problems with implementing a new tax 
base). 
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its shareholders, it would not be able to escape tax liability by 
manipulating its net income, thus rendering its tax avoidance methods 
ineffective. 
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